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THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: 
SUGGESTED CRITERIA 
JESSE H. CHOPER† 
ABSTRACT 
  Whether there should be a political question doctrine and, if so, 
how it should be implemented continue to be contentious and 
controversial issues, both within and outside the Court. This Article 
urges that the Justices should reformulate the detailed definition that 
they have utilized (at least formally) since 1962, and adopt four 
criteria to be applied in future cases. The least disputed—textual 
commitment—is the initial factor listed in Baker v. Carr. The other 
three are based on functional considerations rather than constitutional 
language or original understanding. The first of these—structural 
issues: federalism and separation of powers—has been advanced and 
developed at length in my earlier work. It is based on a comparative 
advantage of the political process over the Court in sound 
constitutional decisionmaking respecting the relevant issues, as well as 
the trustworthiness respecting fundamental values of the national 
legislative/executive branches in doing so. The remaining two criteria 
involve removing questions of individual rights from the judiciary's 
realm, something that would (and should) occur very infrequently. 
The manageable standards test recognizes that there may be 
constitutional provisions for which the Court lacks the capacity to 
develop clear and coherent principles. The generalized grievance 
guide is similar in many ways to structural issues in that it is also 
grounded in matters of comparative advantage and trustworthiness of 
results. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With roots tracing to Marbury v. Madison,1 the political question 
doctrine—that courts should abstain from resolving constitutional 
issues that are better left to other departments of government, mainly 
the national political branches2—has been most ambitiously, and 
authoritatively, defined by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr:3 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
 
 1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 2. Id. at 165–66. 
 3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
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commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the 
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.4 
But despite these carefully developed (and seemingly  readily 
applicable)5 criteria, the doctrine has rarely served as a meaningful 
restraint on the Supreme Court’s authority. Now, catalyzed by the 
Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore,6 in which the Justices voted 5 to 4 to 
resolve a presidential election dispute without so much as mentioning 
the doctrine, scholars have concluded that political questions are in 
serious decline, if not fully expired, because they are clearly at odds 
with the notion of judicial supremacy adopted by the Court in recent 
years.7 Moreover, within the past fifteen years, the Court has raised 
the possibility that the Guarantee Clause may again become part of 
the judiciary’s repertoire.8 But other decisions over the past three 
decades suggest that reports of the political question’s demise are 
premature. Two rulings, each authored by the Court’s then-Chief 
Justice, specifically invoked the doctrine in refusing to subject to 
judicial review either “the composition, training, equipping, and 
control” of the National Guard9 or the congressional impeachment 
 
 4. Id. at 217. 
 5. For intense criticism of the Baker specifications as being “useless,” “confusing and 
unsatisfactory,” see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
129–30 (2d ed. 2002). See also infra  note 13 and accompanying text. 
 6. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 7. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political 
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (2002) 
(“[T]he demise of the political question doctrine is of recent vintage, and it correlates with the 
ascendancy of a novel theory of judicial supremacy.”); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the 
Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 
80 N.C.  L. REV. 1203, 1233 (2002) (contrasting the Warren Court’s assertion of judicial 
supremacy and use of prudential decisionmaking with that of the Rehnquist Court). 
 8. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184–85 (1992) (noting that both a 1964 
Court decision and constitutional scholars suggest that not all Guarantee Clause claims present 
nonjusticiable political questions). 
 9. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (Burger, C.J.).  
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process.10 Indeed, just two Terms ago, four members of the Court 
urged its application to partisan political gerrymandering, one 
deferred consideration of the matter, and none of the remaining 
Justices even suggested that nonjusticiability was no longer a viable 
approach.11 Thus, it continues to be true that “whether or not a 
political question doctrine should be recognized as purely a 
normative matter, . . . the modern Court has adopted such a doctrine, 
both in theory and practice.”12 Consequently, it appears to be an 
appropriate occasion to ask both what remains of the political 
question doctrine and what role it should play in the future. 
A significant part of my thinking and writing over the years has 
focused on the political question issue, particularly in connection with 
my proposals that the Court should not decide structural 
constitutional questions—those concerning the authority of the 
national government vis-à-vis the states or the respective powers of 
Congress and the president.13 Although it has been recently said that 
“the effort to make the political question problem into a ‘doctrine’—
to bound it by a rule of law—is a fool’s errand,”14 this Article expands 
on my prior work and attempts to paint a fuller picture of the reach of 
the political question principle. In setting out a series of fairly specific 
criteria to guide the determination of a political question, my goal has 
been to avoid the legitimate criticism of the Baker formulation as 
depending “almost entirely on the discretion of the majority of the 
Justices, untethered to any legal principles rooted in the 
Constitution’s structure, theory, history, or early precedent.”15 The 
rationale advanced in this Article  is closely tied to my conception of 
the role of judicial review in American representative democracy and 
centers primarily on questions of comparative institutional 
competence and the distinction between structural constitutional 
 
 10. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.). 
 11. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 267–70 (2004). 
 12. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 
1031, 1035 (1984). 
 13. See generally  JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980). 
It may be worth noting that, because of the ongoing controversy over the doctrine of “political 
questions,” I never used the phrase in the book, instead describing the inquiry as involving the 
“justiciability” of various constitutional issues. 
 14. Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 442 (2004). 
 15. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the 
Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C.  L. REV. 1165, 1196 (2002). 
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issues and individual rights. Part I presents a standard definition of 
the political question doctrine and suggests four criteria by which 
courts should determine whether a particular case is a nonjusticiable 
political question. Part II presents a comprehensive application of 
these criteria to a number of legal issues that are often thought to be 
political questions. 
I.  DEFINITION OF POLITICAL QUESTION 
I define “political question” as follows: a substantive ruling by 
the Justices that a constitutional issue regarding the scope of a 
particular prov ision (or some aspects of it) should be authoritatively 
resolved not by the Supreme Court but rather by one (or both) of the 
national political branches.16 A further refinement, however, is 
needed. Thus, Professor Mark Tushnet describes the political 
question “issue” in two separate ways: (1) “Who gets to decide what 
the right answer to a substantive constitutional question is?” and (2) 
“Does the Constitution give a political branch the final power to 
interpret the Constitution?”17 The first comports with my 
formulation. The second differs, seemingly invoking what the Court 
in Baker v. Carr labeled a “textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment,”18 resting essentially on conventional constitutional 
interpretation. 
While I readily accept the “textual commitment” principle,19 my 
approach, drawing heavily on my earlier analysis,20 is mainly a 
functional one, rather than one grounded in constitutional language 
or original understanding,21 and essentially describes the current 
 
 16. It should be absolutely clear that this conclusion by the Court does not state its belief 
that any decision reached by the designated official body is constitutionally correct, but only 
that it is within the province of that governmental organ to make. 
For a brief consideration of state court decisions of “political questions,” see infra  
note 81. 
 17. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1207. 
 18. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 19. See infra  notes 27–36 and accompanying text. 
 20. See generally CHOPER, supra note 13. 
 21. My analysis may be fairly characterized as “extra constitutional,” Seidman, supra note 
14, at 459, in the sense that it is grounded in policy (“functional”) considerations that I have 
openly urged as leading to wise and proper constitutional decisionmaking. Since I have never 
suggested otherwise, however, it is inaccurate to describe my view as having “an unarticulated 
and undefended political position” that “subverts the core assumptions of constitutionalism by 
deciding the very political questions it purports to avoid.” Id. Thus, my “political position” has 
never meant to be “best achieved by manipula ting the jurisdictional responsibilities of the 
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system: one branch of government should be the final arbiter of 
disputes over each provision of the Constitution (or certain types of 
issues arising under it), but it should not be the same branch for all 
such matters.22 And I generally subscribe to the view that the Court 
should have the ultimate say as to which branch decides.23 In most 
respects, I see the Justices’ analysis of the political question doctrine 
as involving the same justifications that govern the institutional role 
of judicial review under our form of government—most importantly, 
whether the political branches at both the national and local levels 
can be trusted to determine the meaning and scope of a particular 
constitutional provision.24 
I believe that the Court should consider four criteria in 
determining whether to relegate questions of constitutional 
interpretation to the political branches. First, the Court should refrain 
from deciding questions where there is a textual commitment25 to a 
coordinate political department—that is, when the Constitution itself 
is interpreted as clearly referring the resolution of a question to an 
 
various political branches.” Id. For example, the “Federa lism Proposal” urged in my book, see 
CHOPER, supra note 13, at 171, would have the Court decline to adjudicate the constitutional 
issue of national power versus states’ rights in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see id. 
at 561 n.3 (comparing the federal and state power to criminalize conduct). But I have not 
hesitated to express my “political” (policy) view as agreeing with Professor Donald Regan’s 
position that “[t]here is nothing in the background of the [Gun-Free Schools Zone Act] to 
suggest that states are less capable of dealing with the problem of guns in schools than the 
federal government; nor is there anything to suggest the states are inadequately motivated to do 
so.” Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally 
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 578 (1995). Consequently, I have recently 
urged that congressional action in that situation is unwarranted. Jesse H. Choper, Taming 
Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend? , 55 ARK. 
L. REV. 731, 772 (2003). 
 22. This is similar, but not identical, to ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION 84 (1987). 
 23. One cannot unqualifiedly accept this formulation without rejecting the venerable 
positions of Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln that no branch of government is authorized to act 
as final arbiter and that each may determine constitutionality when exercising its 
constitutionally assigned powers. My functionally grounded instincts coincide with our 
developed thinking that the Court should possess the ultimate decisionmaking authority and 
that the other departments should feel bound thereby. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 
(1958) (holding in the context of desegregation that, while education is primarily a state power, 
it is a power which must be exercised in accordance with federal constitutional requirements as 
announced by the Court). Still, there are situations where I lean in the opposite direction, 
particularly when this produces greater security for individual rights, e.g., after the Court 
upholds the constitutionality of a federal statute, a president who disagrees with the Court’s 
judgment declines to enforce it, pardons those convicted under it, or vetoes similar legislation. 
 24. See infra  Part I.B. 
 25. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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elected branch. Second, pursuant to a functional rather than a textual 
approach, when judicial review is thought to be unnecessary for the 
effective preservation of our constitutional scheme, the Court should 
decline to exercise its interpretive authority. Third, the Court should 
not decide issues for which it cannot formulate principled, coherent 
tests as a result of “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards.”26 Finally, I would tentatively suggest that constitutional 
injuries that are general and widely shared are also candidates for 
being treated as political questions. These four criteria have a 
common thread: they identify questions either that the judiciary is ill-
equipped to decide or where committing the issue to some political 
branch promises a reliable, perhaps even a superior, resolution. 
A. Textual Commitment 
The first criterion, textual commitment to a coordinate branch, 
involves the allocation of power among the national branches. It is 
perhaps the most straightforward.27 It is difficult to disagree with the 
proposition that if the text of the Constitution or the original 
understanding of its meaning, as reflected in its “structure and 
underlying political theory,”28 persuasively leads to the conclusion 
that the elected branches rather than the Court should be the final 
arbiter of its meaning, then the Justices should withdraw. Although, 
as I shall discuss further, this will very rarely be true, it merits 
emphasizing that the Court’s finding a political question under any of 
my four suggested tests does not instruct either Congress or the 
president or state legislators or executive officials that they have an 
unbounded discretion to settle the matter, but rather that their task is 
to make as informed and sensitive a constitutional judgment as 
possible. 
The consequences of removing the prophylaxis of judicial 
oversight by vesting full authority in the political branches are, of 
course, incalculable. Still, it must be remembered that political action 
by multi-member bodies often depends on the votes of just a few. 
Thus, the possibility that the product of the decisionmaking process 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. For the view that this is the sole ground for departing from Marbury ’s edict that “it is, 
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is,” 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1959).  
 28. Pushaw, supra  note 15, at 1196. 
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of the political branches, when they consciously exercise final 
constitutional authority, will be undertaken with a greater adherence 
to principle than when they engage in ordinary lawmaking is greatly 
increased by the fact that only a small number of legislators (or 
executive officers) are usually needed to determine the outcomes. 
Only their sense of duty must be affected.29 Consequently, there is at 
least some reasonable chance (as could arise by the Court’s possible 
ruling that certain claims of individual rights in the area of military 
and foreign affairs are committed for resolution by the national 
political branches)30 that acceptance of this constitutional 
responsibility by the president and legislature may result in greater 
protection for personal liberties than would the Court’s deciding the 
merits while giving great deference to the political decisionmakers (as 
the government argued and some of the lower courts decided in the 
initial group of War on Terrorism cases to reach the Supreme 
Court).31 
This possibility of greater political responsibility may be 
illustrated by the operation of the firm rule in place between 1935 and 
1990 respecting the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause. The Court upheld exercises of authority over state and local 
matters as long as “Congress had a rational basis for finding that . . . 
[the regulated activity] affected commerce.”32 The rationale of how 
judicial review—rather than treatment of the matter as a political 
question—may tend to enhance national hegemony rather than 
protect local governance in the context of the Commerce Clause is 
simple enough. Suppose that members of Congress who ignore 
constitutional concerns for states’ rights prevail in the legislative 
process, and the Court then upholds the enacted statute in deference 
to Congress’s apparent judgment that it is constitutional. But if that 
congressional judgment has never really been made, judicial review is 
self-defeating. Lawmakers who believe that constitutionality is the 
equivalent of whatever the Court upholds will be emboldened to take 
further national steps into what were previously thought to be state 
 
 29. For modern examples of serious constitutional consideration by some national 
legislators, see Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.  L. 
REV. 707, 718–22, 740–41 (1985).  
 30. Cf. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), described 
infra in note 212. 
 31. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld 
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 32. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). 
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preserves. Indeed, even those Senators and Representatives who are 
most sensitive to the limits of national power, and who treat the 
constitutional question very seriously, cannot help but be affected by 
judicial validation on the merits of earlier federal regulations. As 
another illustration of this dynamic, it may well be that the Senate 
will act more conscientiously and with greater sensitivity while trying 
impeachments when the legislators know that their decision is final 
than if the rule were that the action could be challenged in the courts 
but that the Senate possessed “wide discretion”33 and would be 
upheld as long as it stayed within its “broad boundaries.”34 
Even prior to his historic pronouncements in Marbury, John 
Marshall expressed his view that although some “interpretation[s] of 
rules of law . . . demanded the exercise of the type of discretionary 
judgment that characterizes political action,” this “did not thereby 
cease to be a matter of applying legal norms” and “principle[s],”35 and 
he “believed in the ability of the political branches conscientiously to 
interpret and obey the Constitution . . . especially in those cases 
beyond the power of the judiciary to resolve.”36 Thus, even if the 
Court had adopted a “color blind” or “strict neutrality” standard for 
its review of race- and sex-based state action under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in contemporary America, were the Justices 
subsequently to rule that the criteria for the selection of high ranking 
Cabinet officials are exclusively within the province of the executive, 
a constitutionally caring president might well conclude that, 
regardless of the judicially determined invalidity of all other kinds of 
race- or sex-based state action, it is important (or “compelling” in 
equal protection terms) that appointed government leaders reflect the 
racial, ethnic, and gender makeup of the general population. 
B. Federalism/Separation of Powers vs. Individual Rights 
The second criterion, like the first, concerns the division of 
authority among the Congress, the president, and the Court, but, like 
the third and fourth criteria, focuses on the functional role of judicial 
review rather than on constitutional text and original understanding. 
 
 33. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 239 (1993) (White, J., joined by Blackmun, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 34. Id. at 253 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 35. Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall’s Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 
373 (1999). 
 36. Id. at 377. 
012306 03_CHOPER .DOC  2/6/2006   10:19 AM 
1466 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1457 
This second gauge distinguishes between matters of constitutional 
structure—questions relating to federalism and separation of powers 
between the political branches37—and those involving individual 
rights. The basic rationale—which is fully developed in my book and 
will only be sketched in this Article—rests on notions of institutional 
competence. By abstaining when the political branches may be 
trusted to produce a sound constitutional decision, the Justices reduce 
the discord between judicial review and majoritarian democracy and 
enhance their ability to render enforceable decisions when their 
participation is vitally needed. Moreover, since issues of 
constitutional power between the nation and the states and between 
the executive and legislative branches turn more on matters of 
pragmatic operation than on those of principled interpretation 
(unlike questions of individual rights), there is a much sounder basis 
for vesting such decisions with the political rather than judicial organs 
of government. It is important to recognize that the constitutional 
issue posed by the contention that the national government or one of 
its political branches has acted beyond its delegated authority is 
wholly different from the assertion that government action abridges 
individual rights. The essence of the latter type of claim is that no 
organ or government—federal or state, legislative or executive—may 
take the challenged action. In contrast, an alleged violation of the 
federalism or separation of powers principles concedes that one of the 
two agencies of government—the nation or the states, Congress or 
the president—has power to engage in the conduct; the argument is 
simply that the particular organ that has acted is, constitutionally, the 
improper one. Finally, since the legislative and executive departments 
are well equipped to handle constitutional structure issues because 
the competing interests—federal power versus states’ rights, 
congressional versus executive authority—are forcefully represented 
in the national political process, the justification for judicial review, 
the most antimajoritarian exercise of the national government’s 
power, is at a low ebb in those matters.38 
 
 37. With respect to constitutional conflicts between the political branches and the Supreme 
Court, I urge that, since the federal judiciary is not well represented in the national political 
process, the Court should continue to use its power of judicial review to reject laws that 
improperly restrict or expand the Court’s authority. See CHOPER, supra note 13, at 380–415. 
 38. Most constitutional provisions that I would subject to political question analysis under 
this criterion may also generate individual rights claims, which should be subject to normal 
judicial review independent of constitutional structure issues. For example, in United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), it was contended that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1936 (which 
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Again, I wish to emphasize the functional rather than textual 
basis for this view. The clauses of the Constitution that allocate power 
between the national government and the states (such as the 
Commerce, Taxing, and Spending powers), and those that divide 
authority between Congress and the president (such as the 
Appointments and Treaty provisions) no more plainly reveal, either 
by text or intent, which institution of government should determine 
the constitutionally proper balance than does Article IV’s proviso 
that “the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government”39 or Article V’s procedures for 
amending the Constitution.40 While the Court has ruled that both the 
Guarantee Clause and Article V raise political questions, they no 
more satisfy the textual commitment criterion than most other clauses 
of the Constitution whose language plainly places power in the 
political branches but still have been traditionally subject to judicial 
interpretation. And, as above, I wish also to underline that although 
these matters of constitutional structure are nonjusticiable under my 
approach, they are still outside the realm of everyday politics in the 
sense that they should not be resolved by conventional political 
criteria  for majoritarian decisionmaking, but rather by a deliberative 
constitutional judgment. To whatever extent this occurs, however—
and I neither contend nor expect that it would be often41—in my view, 
such questions are still best decided by a branch that, unlike the 
judiciary, is capable of being politically accountable and dealing with 
matters of practicality. 
This second criterion, in particular, also takes account of John 
Marshall’s understanding that the constitutional division of authority 
 
regulated wages and hours in factories that produced goods for interstate commerce) exceeded 
Congress’s commerce power, and, even if it were within that power because the matter 
substantially affected interstate commerce, nonetheless such regulation of personal economic 
freedom was a deprivation of property without due process of law, id. at 125. Similarly, in 
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), it 
was charged both that President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s executive agreement with the Soviet 
Union respecting Russian assets within the states was an invasion of states’ rights and that it 
violated the Fifth Amendment by depriving individual creditors of property without due process 
of law and by taking private property without just compensation. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327, 332; 
Pink, 315 U.S. at 221, 226. 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 41. But see supra note 29 and accompanying text (emphasizing that not infrequently only a 
few members of the political branches need be altruistically influenced in order to achieve a 
praiseworthy outcome). 
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is founded largely on questions of institutional competence. 
Professors Walter Dellinger and H. Jefferson Powell write that 
Marshall thought that the Constitution expects of political officials 
no less than of judicial ones the ability and willingness to interpret 
and apply legal norms. But he did not think that in doing so the 
politicians could or would renounce politics. Indeed, on some issues 
only the political capacity to make judgments of prudence and policy 
can fulfill the Constitution’s requirements.42 
To illustrate his approach, Marshall believed that the constitutionally 
established power to extradite under a treaty is properly committed 
to the executive department because only that branch can have a 
complete view of how this judgment will affect the nation’s foreign 
relations.43 Similarly, he voted to uphold a statute granting the 
president the unreviewable authority to identify an emergency that 
justified activating the militia to repel an attack.44 Moreover, the 
Court has continued this practice of invoking the political question 
doctrine when venturing into areas where it believed that the 
executive had special responsibilities. Thus, in Gilligan v. Morgan,45 
the Court declined to exercise close supervision over training and 
command of the Ohio National Guard, explaining that the executive 
and the legislature were better equipped for this task.46 
Adjudication of individual rights claims should similarly depend 
on the special qualifications of each of the branches. The necessity of 
vindicating constitutionally secured personal liberties is the principal 
justification for the awesome (and antimajoritarian) power that 
judicial review confers upon the federal judiciary. For reasons already 
 
 42. Dellinger & Powell, supra note 35, at 376. 
 43. Speech of the Honorable John Marshall (Mar. 7, 1800), in 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) app. note 
I, at 28 (1820). 
 44. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29 (1827).  
 45. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 46. See id. at 10 (“ The complex subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, 
training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military 
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.”).  In 
Gilligan, the Court relied mainly on the textual commitment criterion. See id. at 6 (noting Art. 1, 
§ 8, cl. 16’s explicit reservation to Congress of authority over militias). To the extent that the 
conclusions in all three situations just discussed are ultimately influenced by the judiciary’s 
inability to gather and assess the relevant data, the matter falls within the “manageable 
standards” criterion (to be discussed shortly), see id. at 14 (Blackmun, J., joined by Powell, J., 
concurring) (asserting that courts lack adequate standards by which to judge specific military 
activities), although such factors may surely influence the Court’s judgment on original 
understanding. 
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suggested,47 an alleged violation of constitutional structure simply 
does not implicate the same concerns as for individual rights. Chief 
Justice Marshall adverted to this precept in Marbury when first 
raising the notion of a political question, concluding that no judicial 
involvement is warranted when a claim’s “subjects are political,” thus 
“respect[ing] the nation, not individual rights . . . .”48 This distinction 
exists because, where personal rights of underrepresented interests 
are at stake, it cannot often be assumed that the majoritarian political 
process can produce a trustworthy result. 
Consequently, the Court should be exceedingly reluctant to find 
an individual rights claim to be nonjusticiable, even though it may 
concern “politics,” the political process, or the internal workings of 
the political branches.49 (Of course, this in no way guarantees that the 
personal liberty appeal will succeed.) Nonetheless, there may be 
controversies implicating personal liberties that the Court concludes 
are governed by the political question doctrine. Thus, under the 
textual commitment criterion, as noted earlier, if the Constitution is 
read to commit authoritative interpretation of a constitutional 
provision to the political branches, the Court must decline to rule for 
the claimant. In my judgment, however, the text or original 
understanding would have to be exceptionally  clear to persuade the 
Court to reach this result in order to defeat what it otherwise believes 
may be a violation of a constitutionally protected individual right.50 
Few (if any) constitutional provisions unambiguously require such a 
determination. 
C. Judicially Manageable Standards 
My third criterion, the absence of “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards,” is drawn from Baker v. Carr.51 It is concerned 
not only with issues arising at the national level (as Baker reasoned), 
but it (and my fourth criterion as well) also includes acts of state or 
local governments and addresses not just questions involving division 
 
 47. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 48. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). 
 49. See generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
 50. For a prominent example of a court  that does so, see Hobson v. Tobriner, 255 F. Supp. 
295 (D.D.C. 1966), in which the court, drawing on a long line of Supreme Court opinions, read 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 as granting Congress “plenary power” to deny citizens of the District of 
Columbia “the right to vote insofar as the local government is concerned,” id. at 299–300. 
 51. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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of power but mainly issues of individual rights.52 The “manageable 
standards” test reflects the judgment that, under some circumstances, 
a decidedly practical restraint on justiciability may be necessary. 
There may be constitutional provisions for which the Court simply 
lacks the capacity to develop clear and coherent principles to govern 
litigants’ conduct. This is true even though the Justices can always 
produce some standard. Professor Tushnet argues, for example, that 
the “one person, one vote” precept developed by the Court in 
Reynolds v. Sims53 exceeds the Court’s proper role in fashioning 
creative guidelines while using what it claims are simply “ordinary 
[methods] of constitutional interpretation.”54 For me, however, the 
real question is whether a particular standard is constitutionally 
warranted (“judicially discoverable”), desirable, and sufficiently 
principled to guide the lower courts and constrain all jurists from 
inserting their own ideological beliefs in ad hoc, unreasoned ways. 
Although my thinking about this is still tentative, examples of the 
constitutional problems that may resist judicial efforts to resolve in 
accordance with the criteria just set out include whether a partisan 
gerrymander violates the Equal Protection Clause,55 limiting punitive 
damages under the Due Process Clause, and (probably most 
controversially) the definition of a regulatory “taking” under the Just 
Compensation and Takings Clause.56 
 
 52. For the view that this is consistent with the pre-Baker use of the political que stion 
doctrine, see Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 
75 YALE L.J. 517, 538–39 (1966). See also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 184 (1962) (noting that one element of the political question doctrine is “the Court’s 
sense of lack of capacity . . . [because of] the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to 
principled resolution”). 
 53. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  
 54. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1208. Compare Scharpf, supra note 52, at 555–58. 
 55. See infra  Part III.B. 
 56. Whether the judiciary can articulate appropriate criteria for determining whether the 
nation is at “war” was debated in Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
Compare the separate concurrences of Judge Silberman, see id. at 25–27 (noting that there is 
“[no] constitutional test for what is war” in contrast to “measures necessary to repel foreign 
aggression”) and Judge Tatel, see id. at 37 (observing that this is “no more standardless than any 
other question regarding the constitutionality of government action”). For the view that the 
word “war” had a relatively specific meaning at the time the Constitution was ratified, and that 
this meaning has been further refined in case law and diplomacy, see Michael P. Malakoff, The 
Political Question and the Vietnam Conflict, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 504, 507–08 (1970). He argues 
that, if the Court were to confront a question such as “Is the United States now at war?” in the 
course of interpreting the War Powers Clause, it would have several sources of manageable 
standards, including the text of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, the “characteristics 
common to wars,” and “the meaning of the term ‘war’ in international law and in domestic law.” 
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A final observation respecting the manageable standards 
criterion: in Nixon v. United States,57 the Court reasoned that the 
absence of such standards “may strengthen the conclusion that there 
is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”58 
Similarly, Luther v. Borden59 suggested that the definitional 
difficulties that the Court would face in deciding whether a 
challenged state government was “republican” influenced its 
conclusion that the Guarantee Clause was intended to be ultimately 
interpreted by Congress.60 Nonetheless, I am doubtful that the text or 
original understanding of either the Impeachment or Guarantee 
Clauses is sufficiently clear to negate all judicial review, especially 
because of the legitimate individual rights claims that may be made in 
both the impeachment and Luther contexts.61 Therefore, if the Court 
were to determine that a constitutional issue presents a political 
question because of the manageable standards criterion—as was 
suggested by the plurality opinion in Coleman v. Miller62 on the 
question of a reasonable time for the pendency of a constitutional 
amendment63—its conclusion should not be based mainly on the 
textual commitment theory but rather on the functional approach of 
judicial review not being feasible. Once again, however, I want to be 
clear that this criterion is grounded in judicial incapacity to fashion a 
governing standard, and not in the Court’s judgment that the political 
branches ought to have “discretion free of principled rules.”64 To the 
contrary, the ideal is that Congress and the executive will develop 
their own principles, albeit informed by political needs and 
experience. 
 
Id. But see Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 199, 204–05 (1971) (arguing that a judicial attempt to formulate “a workable principle for 
delimiting the President’s power to engage in military activities overseas” would be “far from 
easy” because of line -drawing problems (e.g., whether a declaration of war would be needed to 
send military advisors or arms) and because of courts’ limited ability to assess other relevant 
factors (such as negative effects a declaration of war might have on international relations)). 
For a discussion of manageable standards in respect to proposed constitutional 
amendments, see infra  notes 285–89 and accompanying text. 
 57. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).  
 58. Id. at 228–29; see also supra  note 46. 
 59. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
 60. Id. at 47. 
 61. See infra  notes 126 and 311 and accompanying text. 
 62. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).  
 63. Id. at 436; see infra notes 285–86 and accompanying text. 
 64. BICKEL, supra note 52, at 186. 
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D. Generalized Grievance 
A fourth criterion for nonjusticiability, about which I am yet 
more uncertain than the third, borrows from standing doctrine the 
concept of a “generalized grievance”—a harm by which people are 
injured or affected in a similar way.65 Generalized grievance cases 
may encompass individual constitutional rights insofar as all (or 
almost all) persons may truly be said to have suffered comparable 
injury in respect to their personal liberties. This may fairly lead to the 
conclusion that a decision by a government body that is accountable 
to an electoral majority trustworthily represents all affected. 
Although I believe that there are very few examples of this 
phenomenon, cases such as United States v. Richardson,66 involving 
the contention that the Statement and Account Clause mandated that 
the CIA publish its budget even though a federal statute allowed it to 
be kept secret,67 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the 
War,68 presenting the argument that a Senator’s or Representative’s 
membership in the Armed Forces Reserves violates the 
Incompatibility Clause,69 are potential candidates. 
It is clear that neither clause involves national power versus 
states’ rights. Nor does either appear to cover genuine constitutional 
clashes between Congress and the president. However, it is debatable 
as to whether they pose individual rights issues. It may be that they 
 
 65. Justice Scalia has discussed this factor under the heading of standing, see Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 29–37 (1998) (Scalia, J., joined by O’Connor & Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting), but it seems to me that his rationale, particularly as articulated in an earlier essay, 
see Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 881, 896–97 (1983), leads at least equally to the conclusion that 
this should be treated as a nonjusticiable political question. 
 66. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).  
 67. Id. at 167. 
 68. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).  
 69. Id. at 209–11. Richa rdson held that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing. 418 U.S. at 
179–80. But in Akins, the  Court ruled that “where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the 
Court has found ‘injury in fact,’”  Akins, 524 U.S. at 24, thus enabling Congress to enact a statute 
granting standing and satisfying the Article III “cases” or “controversy” requirement. While I 
do not disagree with Akins’ reasoning in respect to Article III, the political question problem 
presents an independent issue and may result in a finding of nonjusticiability even though the 
situation plainly involves a case or controversy. See CHOPER, supra note 13, at 404: 
[T]he federal judiciary . . . holds ultimate authority to determine that certain 
legislative conferments of jurisdiction either (1) invalidly augment the judicial 
province that is carefully described in Article III or (2) otherwise unconstitutionally 
undermine the critical role historically contemplated and contemporarily demanded 
of the Supreme Court in American government. 
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fall into yet a different category that I have described as 
“housekeeping” matters, dealing with administrative details of the 
federal departments (for example, the minimum age for elected 
national officials) or with relations among the states (for example, the 
Extradition Clause).70 
But assuming (though very doubtfully on my part) that 
Richardson and Reservists embrace constitutionally secured personal 
freedoms, they are clearly distinguishable from the more usual 
constitutional challenges that are plainly understood to implicate 
individual rights such as the freedoms of speech and religion or the 
protections of the accused. In Richardson and Reservists, the injury 
was more uniformly distributed. For example, a statute that required 
everyone to attend religious services on Sunday may be read as 
treating all the same, but its enormously disparate impact is obvious. 
So, too, for a law that compelled all citizens to pay an annual $100 fee 
in order to vote. It might be argued that the Richardson injury, for 
example, is in fact of the same variety, since the denial of information 
about the CIA’s budget also affects people to varying degrees. Some 
will think the withholding of information a desirable precaution, most 
will be indifferent, and a few, like the  plaintiff, will protest. 
Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that the group objecting to the CIA 
measure is a stable or identifiable one, and as a result there is little 
reason to believe that the ordinary political process is not a fair and 
trustworthy method for resolving its concerns.71 This conclusion stems 
largely from the nature of the constitutional provision at issue. Even 
if the Statement and Account Clause might be said to establish a kind 
of personal liberty, it does not appear to be one that falls within the 
class of “fundamental” rights that serve to protect an identifiable 
racial, religious, or political minority that might be subject to 
majoritarian abuse. Such constitutionally secured rights must be 
withdrawn from authoritative interpretation by the ordinary political 
process. Instead, the provision may be seen as establishing a right that 
belongs to the majority (rather than an endangered, constitutionally 
guarded minority), which it may at its own option choose to forego, as 
was done in respect to maintaining secrecy for the CIA budget.72 If a 
 
 70. Id. at 2. 
 71. For a discussion of which minorities merit judicial protection, see id. at 76–77. 
 72. Similar reasoning has been applied with respect to the Incompatibility Clause as 
addressed in Reservists. See Recent Case, Reservists Committee to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. 
Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971), 85 HARV. L. REV. 507, 511 (1971): 
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future majority wishes to reclaim the right, it is a simple matter for it 
to repeal the legislation so as to require normal publication of the 
information. 
When should the generalized grievance criterion apply to a 
situation in which a majority of voters appears to restrict its own 
constitutional rights, such as by agreeing to an unevenly apportioned 
legislature or by imposing term limits for elected officials? Does the 
right at issue belong to the public at large—as might be argued about 
the right to receive information about the CIA’s budget—or is it, 
rather, an individual right that is not subject to majority 
infringement? In the 1964 Reapportionment Cases,73 the Court ruled 
that a malapportioned legislature violates equal protection even if 
approved “by a vote of a majority of a State’s electorate,”74 reasoning 
that because the constitutional principle safeguards the right of each 
citizen “to cast an equally weighted vote,” it extends even to the 
situation in which the majority creating the malapportionment 
includes a majority of those who would be underrepresented by it.75 
This ruling seems to be contrary to the generalized grievance test. It 
may be helpful to contrast the one-person, one-vote guarantee with 
the constitutional right at stake in a case involving laws allegedly 
respecting an establishment of religion. For example, the fact that a 
majority of non-Methodists authorized a state appropriation to 
construct a Methodist church should not bar a court from granting an 
injunction against the use of state funds for this purpose. 
Disregarding majority preferences here would be necessary to 
vindicate the rights of a specially protected minority: non-Methodists 
 
[A]s the [lower] court pointed out, the constitutional provision in question was not 
designed to meet a possible abuse that would typically manifest itself in recognizable 
harm to a single individual or a distinct group of individuals. As a guard against 
executive interference with the legislature, the provision was meant to protect the 
liberties of all citizens. The primary injury which arises from a violation is to the 
polity as a whole and to each citizen as a member of it. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 73. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964). 
 74. Id. at 736. 
 75. Id. It is conceivable that a knowing majority might agree to such a scheme even though 
it would appear to be voting against its own interest. At the time the Reapportionment Cases 
were decided, I noted that white urban voters might support a malapportioned legislature in the 
belief that rural voters would take a firmer stand against integration. Jesse H. Choper, On the 
Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 20, 31 (1967).  Though less likely, it is 
even possible to imagine a similar scenario occurring today. For example, voters in a state 
whose cities were experiencing a wave of pro-tax newcomers might be persuaded to rest a 
greater share of voting power in the reliably anti-tax countryside. 
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who did not want to support the Methodist Church. Similar reasoning 
might be applied to the contention that the Court should refuse to 
consider a constitutional challenge to unequal treatment of women 
because they comprise a political majority. The response would be 
that persons of that gender (perhaps many) do not view such 
government measures as injuring them, but those who do (even if 
they are a minority of all women) should have their equal protection 
rights sustained. 
Term limits and popularly enacted malapportionments, however, 
present a different problem. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,76 
the Court invalidated term limits as applied to members of Congress, 
finding that the requirements for congressional service imposed by 
the Qualifications Clause were meant to be exclusive.77 The Court 
also emphasized the principle that “sovereignty confers on the people 
the right to choose freely their representatives to the National 
Government.”78 Although neither the majority nor the dissent treated 
the issue of term limits as a political question,79 it deserves 
consideration under the generalized grievance criterion. In the 
absence of proof to the contrary, neither the imposition of term limits 
nor an informed referendum establishing unequally sized legislative 
districts would appear to have either the motive or effect of 
preventing  an identifiable minority group from attaining power.80 
Moreover, in contrast to malapportionments that are the exclusive 
creation of a legislature, and which current members have a stake in 
perpetuating, there is no structural barrier to the electorate’s 
 
 76. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).  
 77. Id. at 837–38. 
 78. Id. at 794. 
 79. Justice Thomas in dissent did suggest, however, that any individual rights issues posed 
by the denial of ballot access to particular candidates were best analyzed under the First or 
Fourteenth Amendments rather than the Qualifications Clause. Id. at 925 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 80. In fact, term-limits proponents have suggested that they will increase the 
representation of women and minorities. The reasoning is that legislators elected at a time when 
more barriers existed to women and minority candidacies will no longer enjoy the benefits of 
long-term incumbency, and their opponents will have the opportunity to compete on equal 
ground. In practice, however, the results of recent elections for state legislatures have not borne 
out this view. Professor Rhine L. McLin, The Hidden Effects of Term Limits: Losing the Voices 
of Experience and Diversity, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 539, 544–45 (2001), reports that, while term 
limits have caused some experienced women and minority legislators forced out of state 
assembly seats to run for—and win—contests in state senates, they have done little to bring 
newcomers into the political process, and their overall number in states with term limits has not 
much increased. 
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repealing previously enacted term limits and unwanted districting if 
they no longer command the majority’s support. Therefore, although 
term limits and all malapportionments unquestionably restrict the 
individual’s right to vote, it is not clear to me that this is the sort of 
personal liberty that courts must intervene to protect. Rather, the 
ordinary political process appears to provide a viable alternative.81 
Still, even on the fair assumption that there is no reason to think 
that the political branches cannot be trusted to fairly resolve at least 
several of the constitutional claims discussed above, there are major 
hurdles to be overcome before they may be labeled as nonjusticiable. 
The fact that a widely shared grievance is strongly opposed neither 
guarantees nor perhaps even makes it likely that the political 
branches will correct it. While the traditional electoral process or 
other forms of direct political activity are available in theory, it may 
well be that various impediments will make them unlikely to respond 
very often. Probably, though, when the issue is significant enough, the 
political process will (and has) answered.82 Moreover, the legislative 
or executive branches’ failure to act in situations where the burden is 
very broadly felt does not necessarily make the outcome unfair. For 
both of these reasons, the criterion, if administrable, may still be 
viable. 
II.  PRUDENTIAL APPROACH 
Before applying the four proposed criteria to a series of 
problems often discussed as political questions, a most prominent 
 
 81. A nice question, suggested to me by a very thoughtful comment of Professor Dan 
Farber, is whether a state court’s resolution of a political question (as defined in this Article) is 
final. I think not. Most simply, if a state appellate court were to hold that a federal statute is 
beyond congressional power (and thus, for example, does not preempt a state regulation), the 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review and reverse on the ground that, under the second 
criterion, the national political branches (who have already spoken in enacting the federal law) 
have final authority on the matter. (Although the situation is much less likely, the same result 
follows if a state court were to pass on a constitutional confrontation between Congress and the 
president.) On the other hand, suppose a state court were to decide an individual rights claim 
under a federal constitutional provision that the Justices felt was nonjusticiable pursuant to the 
manageable standards or generalized grievance criteria. If the individual right were one that 
Congress had express or implied delegated power to enforce, as under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the Necessary and Proper Clause—and it would seem that virtually 
all individual rights fit into this category—then the issue would be somewhat more complex, and 
beyond the scope of full consideration in this Article. For discussion shedding some light, see 
infra  notes 112 and 120 and accompanying text. 
 82. For development of this argument, see  CHOPER, supra note 13, at 312–13. 
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proposal merits further consideration: the expedient technique of 
avoiding especially contentious disputes that the Justices may feel 
disinclined to decide according to adequately principled rules because 
of a fear of weakening their already vulnerable branch of 
government. This path of prudence (or “realpolitik”)83 was most 
famously developed by Professor Alexander Bickel (for political 
questions84 as well as other tools of judicial abstinence), discussed by 
Justice Felix Frankfurter in his opinions in Colegrove v. Green85 and 
Baker v. Carr, suggested (albeit inexplicitly ) by the Court’s famous 
formulation in Baker, more recently invoked by Justice David Souter 
in Nixon86 and Justice Stephen Breyer in Bush v. Gore,87 and 
identified historically by scholars as an element of the political 
question doctrine.88 It is plainly questionable when applied to the 
Court’s refusal to decide matters that are brought before it under its 
congressionally imposed mandatory jurisdiction.89 The Court has 
never determined—when faced with a controversy that is sufficiently 
concrete, developed, and adverse to fulfill the explicit requirements 
of Article III—whether the political question doctrine is rooted in the 
Constitution or is simply a judicial construct that exists at the 
sufferance of the political branches.90 Of course, under the textual 
 
 83. Redish, supra note 12, at 1032. 
 84. BICKEL, supra note 52, at 125–26, 183–84. 
 85. 328 U.S. 549, 552–56 (1946). 
 86. 506 U.S. 224, 252–53 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 87. 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 88. Professor Maurice Finkelstein posits that the political question 
applies to all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion 
that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of 
inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences that a 
decision on the merits might entail. Sometimes it will result from the feeling that the 
court is incompetent to deal with the particular type of question involved. Sometimes 
it will be induced by the feeling that the matter is “too high” for the courts. But 
always there will be a weighing of considerations in the scale of political wisdom. 
Maurice Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 344–45 (1924). 
In contrast to this notion of totally unrestrained “ad hoc” avoidance, see David L. 
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 543, 545 (1985), suggesting that entire 
categories of cases should be nonjusticiable. 
 89. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues” —A Comment on 
Principles and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964) (noting that 
Bickel’s analysis largely ignores Congressional regulation of Supreme Court jurisdiction). 
 90. In Baker, the Court stated that its conclusion “that this cause presents no nonjusticiable 
‘political question’ settles the only possible doubt that it is a case or controversy.” 369 U.S. 186, 
198 (1962). This would seem to mean that if the claim did present a political question, there 
might be some doubt that it fell within Art. III, § 2. But the Court then held, in the very next 
sentence, that “the matter set forth in the complaint does arise under the Constitution,” id. at 
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commitment criterion, all the Court need do is to hold as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation that resolution is committed to the 
political branches and that, as a consequence, no ordinary act of 
Congress may supersede the command of the fundamental charter. 
But this does not work for my other three criteria , which are 
functional and not determined by text or original understanding. I 
have argued elsewhere, however, that if the Court concludes that the 
resolution of certain constitutional questions would be inconsistent 
with proper performance of its essential role in our system of 
government, then it should invalidate efforts by the political branches 
to require it to do so.91 Bickel’s prudential approach may well be 
more appropriately used, however, pursuant to the Court’s 
discretionary system of certiorari, now covering almost all of its 
docket. This is totally different from a holding of political question, 
which does not merely put off a final decision to another day, but 
prevents all federal courts from adjudicating the merits of a 
constitutional issue. 
Although I concur in Justice Robert H. Jackson’s famous bon 
mot, offered to inform the Court’s task of interpreting our 
fundamental charter, that the Justices should not “convert the 
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact,”92 and I am not 
unsympathetic to the pragmatic notions about discretion sometimes 
being the better part of valor and living to fight another day, still, I 
would be much troubled in concluding that the Court’s concern for 
individual rights should be affected by its judgment of whether a 
particular result will bring criticism, hostility, or disobedience. Such 
speculation must be based on social-scientific predictions that judges 
are not well equipped to make. More importantly, for the Court to 
make this an element of how it finally interprets the Constitution 
conflicts with the politically neutral and principled role supporting its 
antimajoritarian existence in a democratic government. By following 
this prudential path in any but the most extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances, the Court would be shirking its vital function as that 
government agency of last resort for guarding the constitutional rights 
of those without political influence. 
 
199, thus strongly suggesting that whether or not the malapportionment case raised a 
nonjusticiable political question, it is still “within the federal judicial power defined in Art. III, § 
2,” id. at 200. 
 91. CHOPER, supra note 13, at 404–15. 
 92. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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III.  APPLICATION TO SPECIFIC TOPICS 
The remainder of this Article considers how constitutional issues 
historically considered to be political questions might be analyzed 
under the suggested criteria. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky suggests 
seven broad categories: the guarantee of a republican form of 
government, the electoral process, foreign policy, congressional 
procedure, ratification of constitutional amendments, separation of 
powers questions (I would include federalism under this heading), 
and impeachment.93 While some constitutional provisions fall into 
more than one category (impeachment claims, for example, may 
invoke congressional procedures), this system of classification should 
be helpful in applying the proposed approach and giving it fuller 
content. 
A. Guarantee Clause 
There is no provision of the Constitution more closely associated 
with the political question doctrine than Art. IV, § 4’s mandate that 
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government.”94 The Court has frequently found 
claims based on the Guarantee Clause to be nonjusticiable. In my 
view, however, the Guarantee Clause should be a proper subject for 
judicial review when it is invoked as a guarantor of individual rights. 
A comprehensive examination of the Guarantee Clause 
forcefully contends that it was added to the Constitution mainly as a 
kind of efficiency device—more to ensure the proper functioning of 
government than to protect the individual.95 Professor Arthur 
Bonfield’s position was that the Framers, in devising the provision, 
were influenced by the prevailing political theories of the time and 
believed that the union would be stronger and more stable and 
harmonious if its component states resembled both one another and 
the federal government in structure.96 But neither constitutional text 
nor original understanding would appear to foreclose some role for 
the judiciary in enforcing the thrust of the Clause. In this vein, 
 
 93. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 130. 
 94. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 95. See Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in 
Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1961). 
 96. Id. at 522, 551 n.164 (1961) (citing 2 CHARLES CURTIS, HISTORY, ORIGIN, AND 
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 470 (1858)). 
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Bonfield points out that eighteenth-century courts would likely have 
had little difficulty interpreting its meaning by invoking principles of 
“natural justice”—including the right of suffrage—believed to be 
common to all republican governments.97 In his view, the Framers 
would have seen the phrase as possessing fairly definite content, and 
for that reason amenable  to judicial interpretation. 
Nor would adherence to my criteria depart substantially from 
what has actually been done with respect to Guarantee Clause claims. 
Although the Court has often treated Luther v. Borden as definitively 
foreclosing all judicial consideration of the provision, Professor 
Robert Pushaw has recently pointed out that the Justices frequently 
considered Guarantee Clause claims in the years between Luther in 
1849 and Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon98 in 
1912.99 Several such rulings were cited by Justice O’Connor in her 
opinion for the Court in New York v. United States,100 which rejected a 
“sweeping” view of Luther and indicated that “perhaps not all claims 
under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political 
questions.”101 
In fact, while Pacific States may have helped solidify the 
impression of the Guarantee Clause’s immunity from judicial 
review,102 the Court followed an approach compatible with the one I 
suggest. The plaintiff corporation argued that a tax levied by popular 
referendum was invalid because it had been adopted by direct 
democracy rather than a government “republican” in form.103 The 
Court specifically noted that the plaintiff did not “assert that it was 
denied an opportunity to be heard as to the amount for which it was 
taxed” or that “anything inhering in the tax . . . violated any of its 
constitutional rights,”104 which the Court plainly indicated would have 
 
 97. Id. at 525–28. 
 98. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).  
 99. Pushaw, supra note 15, at 1200. 
 100. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see id. at 184–85 (citing four cases where the Court “addressed the 
merits” of Guarantee Clause claims). 
 101. Id. at  185. Although I support this point, since the act of Congress in New York 
involved no personal liberties issue but rather concerned only national regulatory power versus 
states’ rights, I unqualifiedly disagree with the decision. See generally Jesse H. Choper, 
Federalism and Judicial Review: An Update, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 577 (1994). 
 102. For a discussion of subsequent cases relying on Pacific States for this proposition, see 
Bonfield, supra note 96, at 554 n.180, 556–57. 
 103. Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 137. 
 104. Id. at 150 (emphasis added).  
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presented a justiciable question.105 Instead, Pacific States’ claim was 
“addressed to the framework and political character of the 
government,”106 an issue outside “the reach of judicial power.”107 
Since rather than claiming infringement of its own rights, the 
Pacific States plaintiff indirectly asserted the exclusive rights of the 
state legislature to be Oregon’s lawmaking body (as opposed to the 
people acting by way of initiative), I believe that Pacific States was 
correctly decided. Even if one posits that Oregon’s practice of 
popular referendum violated the Court’s notion of a “republican form 
of government,” it was not challenged as having abridged any 
personal liberty and thus should not have been subject to judicial 
review. And even assuming that the Justices believe that the 
Guarantee Clause does not authorize Congress to alter a practice like 
Oregon’s, were Congress to do so and a challenge claimed only an 
abridgment of states’ rights, there should be no judicial role108 since 
individual rights are not involved.109 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 151; see also id. at 141–42 (discussing whether “the provisions of [Article IV of 
the Constitution] obliterate the division between judicial authority and legislative power upon 
which the Constitution rests”). 
 108. For example, in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916), the Court 
interpreted an act of Congress—that authorized states to create congressional districts “‘in the 
manner provided by the [state] laws,’” id. at 568—as allowing Ohio to establish districts by 
referendum, id. at 568–69. The Court rejected an argument that this referendum process 
violated Art. I, § 4’s proviso that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Davis, 241 U.S. at 567–70. The Court found that this contention “must 
rest upon the assumption that to include the referendum in the scope of the legislative power is 
to introduce a virus which destroys that power, which in effect annihilates representative 
government.” Id. at 569. In turn, the essence of this rationale was that the referendum process 
was at odds with the Guarantee Clause, a matter the Justices would not consider because “the 
question of whether that guarantee of the Constitution has been disregarded presents no 
justiciable controversy but involves the exercise by Congress of the authority vested in it by the 
Constitution.” Id. Since Congress was empowered to enforce the Guarantee Clause, even if 
Congress had “mistakenly dealt with a subject which was within its exclusive control,” it was 
“beyond the limits of judicial power” to intervene. Id. at 570. Assuming that Ohio’s districting 
process did not raise independent issues of individual rights, the Court’s ruling was correct. 
 109. For adjudication of claims that otherwise proper exercises of the Guarantee Clause 
contravene personal liberties, see, e.g., White v. Hart, 80 U.S. 646, 648, 652 (1871) (holding that 
the Contracts Clause was violated by a Georgia constitutional provision, required by Congress 
as a condition of Georgia’s readmission to the Union, that Congress deemed necessary for 
Georgia to have a republican government); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) 
(“[When admitting states,] Congress simply lacks the constitutional power to insulate States 
from attack with respect to alleged deprivations of individual constitutional rights.”).  
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Under this approach, the Guarantee Clause would afford the 
national political branches a significant opportunity, scarcely ever 
undertaken in the past, to determine the meaning of the term 
“republican form of government” in a way that would be greatly 
expanded relative to current understanding. Congress might, for 
example, mandate that all states establish intermediate appellate 
courts or operate with bicameral legislatures under the theory that 
such institutions are necessary elements of a republican government. 
Similarly, Congress might require that every state permit lawmaking 
by initiative or referendum (or, alternatively, forbid states from doing 
so). Indeed, at least in respect to some matters, Congress might elect 
to use the Guarantee Clause as an alternative to § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which the Court has recently interpreted quite 
restrictively, ruling  in City of Boerne v. Flores110 that Congress cannot 
exercise these enforcement powers unless the Court is persuaded that 
the legislation goes no further than remedying or preventing a 
judicially determined constitutional violation.111 
For example, one important area to which the Court has declined 
to extend equal protection principles is whether state and local 
officers may be selected by appointment rather than election. In 
Fortson v. Morris,112 the Court held that the one person, one vote 
principle applies only after a state chooses to hold an election in the 
first instance.113 Therefore, Georgia ’s system—that the governor was 
to be chosen by  the state legislature if no gubernatorial candidate 
obtained a majority (rather than a plurality) in the popular election—
did not violate the right to vote secured by the Equal Protection 
Clause.114 Similarly, the Court has ruled that state and local laws can, 
in many circumstances, structure municipal government to allow 
appointment rather than election of various officials, such as school 
board members.115 Because such practices seemingly affect all 
 
 110. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
 111. Id. at 527, 536. 
 112. 385 U.S. 231 (1966).  
 113. Id. at 232–33. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967) (upholding a system under which 
the county school board was chosen because there is “no constitutional reason why state or local 
officers of the nonlegislative character involved here may not be chosen by the governor, by the 
legislature, or by some other appointive means rather than by an election”); cf. Avery v. 
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476, 480–81 (1968) (holding that equal protection principles do 
apply following the decision to hold an election of local officials). 
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members of the public equally, they are difficult to cast as equal 
protection violations even though they may be seen as undemocratic. 
While this would appear to place these regulations beyond Congress’s 
power in implementing the Civil War Amendments, it need not 
follow that they could not be brought within federal legislation 
enacted pursuant to the Guarantee Clause.116 Similarly, other state 
and local schemes that the Court has declined to invalidate may also 
be suitable for redress by Congress under the Guarantee Clause. For 
example, the Court has held that both of the following claims are 
nonjusticiable: allegations that improper delegations within a state’s 
governmental system contravened “suffrage” rights,117 and attacks on 
the “republican” character of state court decisionmaking 
procedures.118 Moreover, since the approach I have outlined makes 
questions concerning the extent of Congress’s powers under the 
Guarantee Clause nonjusticiable in the absence of an individual rights 
claim, Congress might confidently alter the judicial rulings in any or 
all of these cases. 
It may be useful to explore an additional refinement. When a 
litigant invokes the Guarantee Clause to question state practices, the 
Court might adopt an approach similar to that of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. Elsewhere, I have argued that my proposal about 
the nonjusticiability of the constitutionality of exercises of national 
power versus states’ rights does not apply to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause because, in adjudicating such matters, the Court is not, strictly 
(but importantly) speaking, invoking its momentous power of judicial 
review. Since Congress indisputably has the authority to modify or 
overturn all such decisions,119 the Justices are not issuing the final 
pronouncement on a state or local rule’s constitutionality. 
Nevertheless, the Court’s involvement helps to ensure that 
constitutional values are enforced. In fact, the judiciary may usually 
be better suited to perform this role in the first instance (acting 
 
 116. For an especially ambitious and optimistic consideration of this view, see Ethan J. Leib, 
Redeeming the Welshed Guarantee: A Scheme for Achieving Justiciability , 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 
143, 178–216 (2002). 
 117. O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 248–49 (1915). 
 118. In Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74 (1930), Ohio 
required that, in order for its highest court to declare a law unconstitutional, no more than a 
single justice could dissent, id. at 75. Although five justices had voted to declare a law invalid, 
because there were two dissenters, the law remained in effect. The Court rejected a Guarantee 
Clause challenge on the ground that it presented a political question. Id. at 79–80. 
 119. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 425 (1946). 
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through a district judge) because this primarily concerns gathering 
and weighing evidence of a particular law’s practical effects. 
Moreover, the Court is filling a gap left by the reality that Congress 
lacks the resources to determine on an ad hoc basis the compatibility 
of isolated local ordinances with the broad demands of the federal 
system.120 
A Guarantee Clause approach might be modeled on similar 
principles, though the Court would not be nearly as well informed by 
the many earlier signals that Congress has sent regarding its view of 
the policies underlying the national commerce power. Still, if the 
Justices believe that a state or local policy conflicts with important 
values of republican government embodied in the Guarantee Clause 
that would otherwise go unaddressed, similar to the principle of 
undue burden on interstate commerce in Dormant Commerce Clause 
cases, they would have the power to set it aside. Congress, however, 
would retain full authority to overturn such judicial decisions through 
ordinary legislation. 
Baker v. Carr, which I believe may be viewed as presenting a 
Guarantee Clause claim in disguise, illustrates how the Court has 
treated such issues as justiciable when framed in terms of individual 
rights. Professor Jerold Israel made a forceful argument along these 
lines at the time. He noted that the equal protection notion of 
“‘rational classification’” invoked in Baker is “hardly self-defining,”121 
with no independent meaning in this situation, and instead must be 
shaped by “the basic value system within which it operates.”122 
Without some additional guide, Israel contends, there would be no 
principled basis for finding legislative districts apportioned on the 
basis of, say, political subdivisions to be less “rational” than those 
drawn according to the one person, one vote principle. Instead, a 
legitimate judicial interpretation of the Constitution must rest on the 
fact that such an apportionment scheme conflicts with other 
constitutional values concerning the structure of state governments. 
The “leading Constitutional evidence” is the Guarantee Clause.123 
Under this type of analysis, the Court, pursuing its task of protecting 
individual rights, might even rule that the Guarantee Clause calls for 
 
 120. For elaboration of this argument, see CHOPER, supra note 13, at 206–09. 
 121. Jerold Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future 
of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 107, 131 (1962). 
 122. Id. at 132. 
 123. Id. at 135. 
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judicial review of at least some practices providing for appointment 
instead of election of state and local officers.124 
Luther v. Borden might plausibly fit under a theory akin to that 
of the reapportionment cases. It involved a claim that the state’s 
“established” government was not “republican” and could therefore 
be guilty of a trespass.125 To remove the analysis from the Guarantee 
Clause category, an argument could be made that the majority had 
been completely denied its fundamental right to vote because the 
government in power was not legitimately  elected. In like fashion, an 
executive order making the incumbent governor-for-life would deny 
voting rights to the population at large.126 Of course, the justiciability 
of a Guarantee Clause case entailing individual rights should not 
depend on whether it can be restated as a claim under the Equal 
 
 124. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also Kohler v. Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978 
(E.D. La. 1968). Kohler involved a challenge to a state constitutional amendment on the ground 
that the ballots by which the amendment was adopted were so confusingly worded that their use 
was a deprivation of the right to vote in violation of the Due Process and Guarantee Clauses. Id. 
at 979. While Judge Wisdom, concurring, agreed that the due process claim should be rejected 
on the me rits, he differed with the court’s conclusion that the Guarantee Clause argument 
presented a political question, raising several points that I have also suggested in earlier parts of 
this Article. Id. at 984 (Wisdom, J., concurring). Judge Wisdom noted that although “the 
expanding importance of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . reduced the need for courts to resort 
to the Guaranty [sic] Clause to protect the rights of individuals against a state’s abuse of 
governmental processes[,] . . . the guarantee still has a proper place in a federal system of checks 
and ba lances.” Id. at 984. Neither text nor original intent, he noted, precluded a judicial role, 
and the Court’s previous opinions should be read not to foreclose all judicial involvement in 
Guarantee Clause enforcement, but simply to hold that, in the specific cases decided, judicial 
review was inappropriate because of the “nature of the controversies” involved. Id. at 984 
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 297 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Judge Wisdom 
believed that some questions under the Guarantee Clause might not be susceptible to the 
development of manageable standards, but that it should be the “nature of the question, . . . and 
not the mere invocation of the clause , [that] determines whether a contention is justiciable and 
the clause judicially enforceable.” Id. at 985. In this same vein, it might be that even if the Court 
were to find that appointment (rather than election) of some public officials raised legitimate 
questions of individual rights, challenges to such appointments would still ultimately be 
nonjusticiable because of the manageable standards or generalized grievance criteria. 
 125. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. ( 7 How.) 1, 42–47 (1849). 
 126. This was suggested in Luther, see 48 U.S. at 45 (“Unquestionably a military 
government, established as the permanent government of the State, would not be a republican 
government.”), as well as in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165 (1874), which raised the 
question of whether a republican government could deny the vote to women. For fuller 
development of the scope of this asserted right, see infra  notes 268–69 and accompanying text. 
See also infra  notes 184–86, 253 and accompanying text. 
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Protection Clause.127 At the same time, other Guarantee Clause 
claims, as in Pacific States, should be held to be nonjusticiable.128 
B. Electoral Process 
1. Gerrymanders.  Partisan political gerrymandering 
unquestionably implicates the individual right to vote on an equal 
basis, and—as was the case in Baker v. Carr and its progeny dealing 
with malapportionment—entrenched officials have an obvious, 
powerful disincentive to address the issue.129 Most obviously, the 
Court could adopt a standard similar to that it has chosen for racial 
gerrymandering,130 but only one Justice has ever chosen to do so.131 
Although I find much to favor this approach,132 the prevailing 
sentiment (both judicial and scholarly) strongly questions whether a 
substantive interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that 
invalidated all apportionments that made political factors dominant 
and subordinated the usual districting criteria would be 
constitutionally warranted or desirable. Yet other informed solutions 
as to whether gerrymandering has occurred and how to remedy it 
would seem to require judges to make complex and imponderable 
factual determinations involving such matters as the extent of party 
loyalty among voters, the role of personal appeal or political skill in 
the success of particular candidates, and the degree of influence the 
minority party retained through its ability to lobby or utilize political 
patronage. These factors and many others that are central to 
proposed judicial standards cannot be confidently measured and are 
not readily within the realm of judicial expertise. 
 
 127. See supra notes 110–18 and accompanying text. 
 128. Contra  Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579–80 (1911) (holding that Congress’s power to 
admit new states does not include requiring a state to continue the  then-location of its capital).  
 129. See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 28, 83 (2004) (“In principle, judicial review finds one of its quintessential justifications in 
checking such self-entrenchment.”). 
 130. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) (“[A]ll laws that classify citizens on the 
basis of race, including racially gerrymandered districting schemes, are constitutionally suspect 
and must be strictly scrutinized.”). 
 131. See infra  note 141 and accompanying text. 
 132. See generally  John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly , 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 607 (1998) (discussing possible standards for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering 
cases). 
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Despite two serious efforts, the Court has failed to produce a test 
for partisan gerrymandering that successfully accommodates these 
difficulties. While the plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer rejected 
the view that such rigging of the electoral landscape presented a 
political question, its substantive standard for judicial review—that 
plaintiffs show both discriminatory intent and effect133 to the extent 
that “a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process” 
is consistently degraded134—has proved nearly impossible for litigants 
to satisfy. Most recently, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,135 a four-Justice 
plurality sought to turn Bandemer’s practical result into an explicit 
holding by declaring all political gerrymandering questions to be 
nonjusticiable. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, observed that there are inherent 
problems in identifying impermissible gerrymandering because the 
Constitution itself “contemplates districting by political entities”136 
and because related goals like incumbent protection have been said to 
be clearly permissible.137 Moreover, the plurality emphasized, 
gerrymandering is also difficult for the judiciary to detect since 
traditional districting principles, like adherence to political 
subdivision boundaries, often incidentally advantage one party even 
where no overt partisan motive can be proven.138 Given this backdrop 
of judicial acquiescence in some politically motivated districting, the 
opinion reasoned, any standard that might be developed would 
inevitably depend on when such impulses had gone “too far.”139 The 
plurality contended that these and other reasons reveal that drawing 
such lines would inevitably be both unmanageable and unprincipled. 
The four dissenting Justices in Vieth140 nonetheless propounded 
several tests. Justice Stevens, applying racial gerrymandering 
principles to the political context, argued that the governing criteria 
should “ask whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to 
 
 133. 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
 134. Id. at 132. 
 135. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  
 136. Id. at 286 (plurality opinion). 
 137. Id. at 300. 
 138. Id. at 298. 
 139. Id. at 291. 
 140. Justice Kennedy concurred in the dismissal of the complaint but declined to find a 
political question because he was unwilling to “foreclose all possibility” that “some limited and 
precise rationale” might yet be formulated “to correct” unconstitutional political 
gerrymandering. Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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dominate and control the lines drawn, forsaking all neutral 
principles.”141 Justice Breyer would look more narrowly to situations 
where the group in power fixes district boundaries to achieve 
“unjustified entrenchment” in violation of “basic democratic 
norms”142—in other words, “a situation in which a party that enjoys 
only minority support among the populace has nonetheless contrived 
to take, and hold, legislative power.”143 Justice Souter, joined by 
Justice Ginsburg, proposed a complex five-element test for making 
out a prima facie case,144 and then sketched how it might be applied, 
noting that “[i]nstead of coming up with a verbal formula for [how 
much is] too much, . . . the Court’s job must be to identify clues, as 
objective as we can make them, indicating that partisan competition 
has reached an extremity of unfairness.”145 
Though I am sympathetic to the conflict between political 
gerrymanders and fundamental principles of democracy and effective 
representative government that Justices Souter and Breyer valiantly 
seek to resolve, I nevertheless agree with the plurality’s difficulties 
with these proposals. Among their criticisms are that Justice Souter’s 
test, while appearing to be “eminently scientific,” turns on inquiries 
that are ultimately a matter of degree146 and is hard to reconcile with 
previous opinions suggesting, for example, that protection of 
incumbency may be proper.147 Justice Breyer, according to Justice 
Scalia, relies on factual judgments that may be impossible to 
determine and that, in any case, the judiciary is poorly equipped to 
 
 141. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 361 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 360. Justice Breyer explains that “unjustified entrenchment” means that “the 
minority’s hold on power is purely the result of partisan manipulation” and not base d on those 
factors that may be temporarily  justified, such as “sheer happenstance, the existence of more 
than two major parties, the unique constitutional requirements of certain representational 
bodies such as the Senate, or reliance on traditional (geographic, communities of interest, etc.) 
districting criteria.” Id. at 360–61. He notes that the “more permanently entrenched the 
minority’s hold on power becomes, the less evidence courts will need that the minority engaged 
in gerryma ndering to achieve the desired result.” Id. at 365. 
 144. The plaintiff would have to show membership in a “cohesive political group” that 
“would normally be a major party,” a district created with “little or no heed to traditional 
districting principles,” correlations between the district’s “deviations” from these criteria and 
the distribution of the political group, a hypothetical district that eliminated objectionable 
features and deviated less from traditional principles, and intent to disadvantage this political 
group. Id. at 347–51 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 145. Id. at 344. 
 146. Id. at 296 (plurality opinion). 
 147. Id. at 298. 
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make.148 For example, how are courts to measure the base level of 
support for a political party in the relevant population so as to 
determine whether a minority has unfairly entrenched itself, 
particularly given many Americans’ tendency to identify with a 
political party weakly if at all?149 While Justice Stevens responds to 
these objections concerning an unmanageable judicial role, his 
approach would result in a far greater degree of intervention in the 
political process than the Court and the country seem willing to 
accept. 
Ultimately, this may be one of those contexts in which the 
judicial branch cannot develop effective safeguards for individual 
rights, but where the political process may afford some meaningful 
protection, however flawed. A political party in power, for example, 
may restrain itself from the worst excesses of gerrymandering because 
it fears either future retaliation within its own jurisdiction should the 
electorate reverse its advantage, or the possibility that its avarice will 
be presently emulated in other states where its opponents are in 
control. In addition, optimally successful gerrymandering is 
extraordinarily difficult because it confronts the party in control with 
an inherent tension between fashioning “safe” districts and spreading 
its voters more broadly (but more thinly).150 In the former instance, 
there is a limit to what the party can achieve; in the latter, a small 
change in population or political attitudes may quickly turn a friendly 
district into one less hospitable to its creators.151 
 
 148. Id. at 299–300. 
 149. A candidate who enjoys personal popularity or the advantages of incumbency, for 
example, may often succeed for reasons wholly unrela ted to gerrymandering. Samuel 
Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. 
L. REV. 1643, 1679–80 (1993). 
 150. Justice Breyer cites several authorities that question this in his Vieth dissent. Vieth, 541 
U.S. at 364 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The combination of increasingly precise map-drawing 
technology and increasingly frequent map drawing means that a party may be able to bring 
about a gerrymander that is not only precise, but virtually impossible to dislodge.”); see also id. 
at 345 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the “increasing efficiency of partisan redistricting”); 
Pildes, supra note 129, at 61 (“[V]oters now vote in more predictably partisan patterns than at 
any time in the last fifty years, and . . . technology allows legislators to exploit these patterns 
more efficiently  than ever.”). 
 151. It has been argued that these self-correcting forces often do not exist for racial 
gerrymandering. Because Democrats are strong and stable favorites among most African 
Americans and Latinos, safe majority-minority districts created with race as a factor may satisfy 
both parties. Republicans prefer to have the most reliably Democratic voters concentrated in a 
few districts, while Democrats wish to provide members of a core constituency with the 
representation they desire. Racial gerrymandering, then, may be systemically less susceptible to 
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Still, real potential injury to individual voting rights remains. 
Neither the political process nor the majority’s uncertainties about 
the electorate may be expected to be nearly as successful as litigation 
in correcting the distortions partisan gerrymandering causes.152 The 
intense concern the judiciary has shown with racially motivated 
districting puts its indifference to political gerrymanders into sharp 
relief, especially revealed by the Court permitting as a defense to 
racial gerrymandering the fact that a peculiarly drawn district was 
motivated by the governing party’s desire to entrench itself.153 
Moreover, the extent to which the abuses of gerrymandering will be 
curbed through the political process applies only to the major parties. 
Because there is little chance that any third party would gain power 
and retaliate, few checks exist to dominant-party uses of districting to 
disadvantage splinter groups in the election process.154 Of even larger 
concern, the enhanced use of bipartisan gerrymandering, 
implemented by consensus of both commanding national partisan 
organizations, greatly diminishes the chance of political reform and 
 
adjustment through the political process, creating a greater justification for judicial intervention. 
Ely, supra note 132, at 618–20. 
 152. For a recent argument that political gerrymanders have only a ten-year life span and 
may be made a campaign issue and corrected at an election in a succeeding decade, and that 
they have less locked-in permanence than the population disparities in the conventional 
reapportionment cases, see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: 
Gerrymandering, “Fair Representation” and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 527, 575–76 (2003). He also writes that “the better the gerrymander, the better chance 
that this will be an issue of any salience to prospective voters.” Id. at 575. 
 153. Ely, supra note 132, at 621. Justice Kennedy, concurring in Vieth, also pointed out an 
inconsistency between the Court’s “willingness to enter the political thicket . . . with respect to 
one-person, one-vote claims” and its “categorical refusal to entertain claims against this other 
type of gerrymandering.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 310. 
 154. Even Justice O’Connor, concurring in Bandemer only because of her belief that 
gerrymandering raised a political question, observed that third parties are more likely to be 
victimized by “bipartisan gerrymanders” than either major party is to be lastingly damaged by 
the gerrymandering efforts of the other. 478 U.S. 109, 154–55 (1986). Others, however, have 
argued that small parties, “in a system of frequently shifting coalitions,” serve instead as a “spur 
to political competition.” Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and 
Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1340 (1987). According to this view, the 
major parties both seek to ally with third-party legislators in order to accomplish their goals. 
Third-party lawmakers are thus swing voters who occupy a position analogous to that of small 
firms having niche markets or holdouts who can exact an economic premium. Moreover, the 
interrelatedness of legislative issues me ans that lawmakers “can often translate a decisive or 
highly valued vote on one issue into significant influence over the outcome of other issues as 
well.” Id. 
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“achieves representational parity at the cost of eliminating 
competitive elections.”155 
Overall, the task of developing a manageable standard to address 
political gerrymandering is by no means impossible. The Court could 
adopt either a principle of proportional representation,156 or a rule 
that all consideration of politics in districting violates equal 
protection, or, most comprehensively, a requirement that some form 
of “neutral” apportionment system (such as a computer program or 
bipartisan commission) be used. As previously indicated, however, 
these positions are far distant from the nation’s longstanding tradition 
and practice. Nonetheless, the last alternative has been gaining some 
operational currency, not only in this country157 but also in “[o]ther 
longstanding democracies that use or recently used the same election 
structure as the United States, such as Great Britain, Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand.”158 Still, these suggestions appear to be 
well beyond where the Court is willing to go; Justice Stevens ’ Vieth 
dissent is the closest the Court has come. Furthermore, at least the 
first two notions would likely engender widespread public resistance. 
The idea that the governing party, and the particular incumbents 
holding office, are entitled to certain spoils of power is quite deeply 
embedded in our democratic process. 
The results of this situation—“a central pathology of modern 
American democratic institutions”159—trouble me considerably as a 
 
 155. Pildes, supra note 129, at 64; cf. id. at 62–64 (discussing the emergence of bipartisan 
gerrymandering as a new “threat to American democracy”). 
 156. For reference to several scholarly works to support the conclusion that “a single -
member-district system helps to assure certain democratic objectives better” than proportional 
representation, see Vieth, 541 U.S. at 357 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 157. See id. at 362–63 (noting the increasing use of independent commissions for legislative 
redistricting). It has been reported yet more recently that “[l]argely uncoordinated 
campaigns . . . to end, or at least minimize” political gerrymandering “were under way in at least 
eight states, including California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.” Adam Nagourney, States See Growing Campaign for New 
Redistricting Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2005, at A19. 
  Note, however, that in 
a fairly large state population with a fairly large congressional delegation, districts 
assigned so as to be perfectly random in respect to politics would translate a small 
shift in political sentiment, say a shift from 51% Republican to 49% Republican, into 
a seismic shift in the makeup of the legislative delegation, say from 100% Republican 
to 100% Democrat. 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 1824. 
 158. Pildes, supra note 129, at 78; see generally id. at 78–83. 
 159. Id. at 56. 
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matter of policy. The prospect of gerrymandering without any 
external constraints is a daunting one that ultimately bears the 
potential to effectively nullify the right to an equally weighted vote 
guaranteed by Baker v. Carr.160 Nevertheless, I have so far not seen 
any proposed solution akin to the one person, one vote standard of 
Reynolds v. Sims that would satisfy my criterion of being 
constitutionally warranted (“judicially discoverable”), desirable, and 
sufficiently principled to guide the lower courts and constrain all 
jurists from inserting their own ideological beliefs in ad hoc, 
unreasoned ways.161 Professor Richard Pildes does not disagree, but 
instead submits that “[p]roblems like gerrymandering require a shift 
in the way manageable judicial remedies are conceived.”162 By 
accounting for “politicians ’ interests in certainty and control, judicial 
creation of general but necessarily vague constraints, with a credible 
threat of application, might generate . . . political accommodation and 
compromise”163 that would lead to “a stable equilibrium.”164 While 
this may ultimately be an effective avenue of relief, it remains too 
distant from my view of the proper role of judicial review and 
constitutional adjudication in our representative democracy. 
2. Textual Commitment: Article I, Section 2.  In Wesberry v. 
Sanders,165 the Court interpreted Art. I, § 2, cl. 1, providing that the 
House “shall be composed of Members chosen . . . by the People of 
the several States,”166 to require parity in the apportionment of 
congressional districts.167 Justice Harlan’s dissent argued textual 
 
 160. Schuck, supra note 154, at 1327–28. 
 161. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
  Professor Samuel Issacharoff proposes to “forbid ex ante the participation of self-
interested insiders in the redistricting process” by adopting “approaches . . . such as blue -ribbon 
commissions, panels of retired judges, and Iowa’s computer-based models . . . [that are] viable 
alternatives to the pro-incumbent status quo.” Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and 
Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 643–44 (2002); see also supra notes 157–58 and 
accompanying text. While I find this to be very sensible as a policy matter, it is less clear by what 
constitutional authority the Court could legitimately impose it as a “discoverable” standard. 
Nevertheless, as Issacharoff has pointed out, the Court has sometimes developed such 
“prophylactic rules” in areas in which the danger of a constitutional violation is great but there 
is difficulty in “policing it after the fact.” Issacharoff, supra , at 646. 
 162. Pildes, supra note 129, at 66. 
 163. Id. at 68, 70. 
 164. Id. at 68. 
 165. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 166. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 167. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8. 
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commitment. He felt that the majority had read too much into the 
language of Art. I, § 2 while ignoring the text of Art. I, § 4,168 which 
“states without qualification that the state legislatures shall prescribe 
regulations for the conduct of elections for Representatives and . . . 
that Congress may make or alter such regulations.”169 Moreover, it 
was improbable that the Framers would “bury” a principle of equal 
representation in Art. I, § 2 yet “omit all mention of it from § 4, which 
deals explicitly with the conduct of elections.”170 Justice Harlan 
concluded that § 4 was intended to be the Constitution’s exclusive 
provision dealing with the election of representatives, and that it “as 
plainly as can be . . . committed [the issue] exclusively to the political 
process.”171 
Justice Black’s opinion for the majority in Wesberry,  
reasoning that “[t]he right to vote is too important in our free society 
to be stripped of judicial protection by such an interpretation of 
Article I,”172 corresponds to my view. Because the dilution of one’s 
vote for a member of Congress unquestionably involves individual 
rights, the Court should be reluctant to construe the Constitution in a 
way that would completely preclude judicial review of such a claim. 
As the dispute between the dissent and the Wesberry majority (which 
contended that evidence of the Framers’ purpose existed to support 
the principle of equality in districting)173 illustrates, a wholly 
conclusive answer can rarely be gleaned from either text or original 
intent. In light of the Court’s core constitutional function as a 
guardian of individual rights, when the basic document does not 
unmistakably place a government function exclusively in the hands of 
a political branch, a convincing case for judicial review can almost 
always be made, even though it may eventually be defeated by the 
manageable standards or generalized grievance criteria.174 
 
 168. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of chusing Senators.”). 
 169. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 29–30 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. at 29; see also id. at 47 (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove v. 
Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), which states that when “standards of fairness are offended, the 
remedy ultimately lies with the people,” id. at 554). 
 171. Id. at 48. 
 172. Id. at 7. 
 173. Id. at 7–8. 
 174. Although Art. II, § 2, cl. 3’s grant of power to the president—“to fill up all Vacancies 
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire 
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3. Electoral College.  Adjudication about the operation of the 
Electoral College raises similar issues.175 Many concern only matters 
of federalism—the states’ authority to determine how presidents are 
chosen.176 Electoral College procedures also allocate power between 
branches of the national government by designating Congress to be 
overseer of presidential elections. Under my second criterion, neither 
of these matters should be justiciable. However, in the unusual case 
when a plausible individual rights claim can be made, the 
Constitution should not ordinarily be interpreted to preclude judicial 
review. 
Suppose that an elector alleges that the Senate had racially 
discriminatory motives for failing to tally his vote in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. The judiciary should hear the merits, even 
though it involves an investigation into matters of internal 
congressional procedure. The same result should follow if the 
elector’s grievance were against a state rather than Congress—for 
example, that a state law required electors to be of a particular 
religion or race. Indeed, even if no claim of racial discrimination were 
raised, and the elector ’s dispute with Congress concerned whether the 
elector had followed proper procedures for casting his vote or 
whether Congress had adhered to the vote-tallying requirements of 
Art. II, § 1, cl. 3, the Court should still be available to resolve claims 
that constitutionally secured individual rights have been abridged. 
While it is likely that the Court would adjudicate at least some 
complaints of this kind, it has complicated the matter by having 
described state legislatures as possessing plenary power to choose the 
means of selecting electors. In McPherson v. Blacker,177 prospective 
presidential electors cha llenged Michigan’s process of selection by 
geographical districts rather than as a single statewide slate.178 In 
finding this method to be constitutional, the Court emphasized that 
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, providing for state appointment of electors “in such 
Manner as the Legislature . . . may direct,” committed “the whole 
 
at the End of their next Session” —plainly interferes with the right to vote, its text strikes me as 
presenting a potentially strong exception to the presumption of an active role for the courts. 
 175. See Art. II, § 1, cls. 2, 3 (prescribing the allocation of electoral votes and the procedures 
for casting and counting those votes). 
 176. See, e.g., Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 32–36 (1968) (discussing whether an act of Congress nullifying votes of 
unfaithful electors invades states’ rights designated in Art. II, § 1). 
 177. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 178. Id. at 26. 
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subject” to the “direction of the legislature.”179 More recently, in Bush 
v. Gore, although every member of the Court was willing to subject 
state rules governing elections to a judicial challenge under individual 
rights provisions of the Constitution, three Justices continued to 
espouse the idea that Art. II, § 1 grants near-complete authority to 
state legislatures.180 
This view requires a judicial decision on the merits about the 
degree of discretion that the constitutional provision awards to the 
states. Even though the Court in McPherson explicitly rejected the 
argument that it should apply the political question doctrine,181 in 
effect it did so pursuant to the textual commitment approach when it 
ruled that under the Constitution “the legislature possesses plenary 
authority to direct the manner of appointment.”182 Nonetheless, a 
better way of deciding the issue would have been pursuant to my 
second suggested criterion regarding national power versus states’ 
rights. As the McPherson Court concluded, the manner in which a 
state selects its electors raises issues of the degree to which states 
should control the elector selection process free of “congressional and 
federal influence.”183 Congress and the states can usually negotiate 
questions about the scope of this power and judicial involvement is 
therefore unnecessary. 
The Court’s phrasing in McPherson indicated that state 
legislatures’ discretion to choose the method of selecting electors is 
not bounded by any constitutional provisions. But in the absence of 
an unmistakable message from constitutional text or structure, this 
should not be the case. As discussed above, the federal judiciary 
should consider that, for example, a state prohibition on women or 
blacks serving as electors violates the Constitution. Even a complaint 
akin to that at issue in McPherson would call for judicial intervention 
if, for example, the plaintiff had been able to demonstrate an equal 
protection violation in the way in which Michigan’s districts were 
apportioned. The “plenary” discretion of state legislatures to choose 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia and 
Thomas, JJ., concurring) (asserting that, while ordinarily the question of the div ision of powers 
among branches of state government is not a matter of federal law, “there are a few exceptional 
cases in which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on a particular branch of a 
State’s government. [Article II, § 1, cl. 2] is one of them”). 
 181. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23. 
 182. Id. at 25. 
 183. Id. at 35. 
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the way electors are selected may not be used to violate other 
constitutional clauses designed to protect the individual. If a state has 
exercised its Art. II, § 1 power in that way, the issue should be 
justiciable. 
Even some constitutional claims relating to the Electoral College 
that raise individual rights issues, however, may not be amenable to 
judicial review if they fall into the generalized grievance category. For 
example, suppose an elector runs on a slate pledged to a particular 
individual but instead casts his vote for someone else, and a supporter 
of the frustrated candidate, who would have otherwise prevailed in 
the Electoral College, seeks to compel Congress to disqualify the 
unfaithful elector ’s ballot.184 The integrity of the plaintiff’s 
constitutionally protected right to vote (in contrast to any that the 
elector may possess), which has been rendered totally ineffective, 
plainly appears to be at issue. This would be similar to an allegation 
that the procedures of Art. II, § 1 have not been followed—for 
example, that the Senate has not formally tallied the votes as 
instructed.185 The key question, however, is whether the disappointed 
voter has been harmed to any greater degree than all (or almost all) 
other members of the public. If not, this might present a situation 
analogous to the one described in the context of the Statement and 
Account Clause,186 which would mean that a decision reached by the 
organs of Congress that resolve Electoral College disputes would be 
politically accountable to a majority of voting citizens and thus 
trustworthily represent all affected. Nonetheless, persuasive 
arguments in favor of judicial review may be made because of the 
complexities involved in concluding (1) that the majority that would 
win in the Electoral College if the plaintiff’s challenge succeeds would 
otherwise have suffered a generalized grievance, and, even if so, (2) 
that this group of citizens has an effective political remedy in the 
hypothesized situation. 
 
 184. On the constitutionality of electors’ discretion as a matter of original understanding 
and contemporary tradition, see Rosenthal, supra  note 176, at 18–25. 
 185. For fuller development of the scope of this asserted right, see infra notes 268–69 and 
accompanying text. See also supra note 126 and accompanying text; infra note 253 and 
accompanying text. 
 186. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
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C. Foreign Affairs 
1. War Powers. 
a. In General.  Constitutional questions about the war 
power arise most frequently when the president takes military action 
without congressional approval. This implicates the division of 
authority between the political branches and, in the absence of 
additional circumstances, raises no individual rights claim. Thus, 
direct complaints by members of Congress or the public generally 
that the executive has sent troops abroad without a legislative 
declaration of war are nonjusticiable under my proposed 
framework.187 
The particular basis for this position is that the judiciary should 
not intervene in a matter that can be appropriately resolved within 
the political process. Although the modern presidency is usually 
perceived as holding the much stronger hand in conflicts between the 
executive and legislative branches over military affairs, Congress has 
many effective tools available to express its disagreement. 
Consequently, presidents have normally sought congressional 
approval before launching warlike conduct and have consulted 
frequently with Congress during such engagements.188 They have also 
been influenced by popular opinion more often in this arena than 
with most government actions. 
Still, the equation changes when a matter of individual rights is 
involved, and the courts may be called on to interpret the 
Constitution in connection with use of the armed forces that has been 
approved by one or both of the political branches. This would occur, 
for example, if an American soldier is ordered to aggressively 
interrogate a prisoner held abroad who is suspected of terrorism and 
the soldier refuses because he believes that the captive should be 
treated as a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention. His 
argument, which should be addressed by the judiciary, is that carrying 
 
 187. See generally CHOPER, supra  note 13, at ch. 5; see also id. at 296 (contending that the 
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), “should have held the question of whether President 
Lincoln had the constitutional authority without the approval of Congress ‘to institute a 
blockade of ports in possession of persons in armed rebellion against the Government’ to be 
beyond judicial purview” (quoting The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 665 (1862))). 
 188. See id. at 281–305 for an extended discussion of Congress’s capacity to influence the 
president’s decisions in this area. 
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out the command would violate international law and subject him to 
criminal penalties, thus confronting him with a choice that would 
deny due process. This reasoning would also apply to a draftee, 
dispatched to a battle zone, who alleges that his participation would 
constitute a “war crime” under principles of international law.189 
b. Habeas Corpus.  Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 has historically provided 
an important constitutional question about the war power. It states an 
exception to the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus may not 
be suspended: “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.”190 When President Abraham Lincoln first and most 
famously used this special exemption during the Civil War, the 
fundamental question was whether Congress, and not the president, 
has the power because the Constitution is silent on this issue.191 (That 
one of the two political branches may act has never been disputed.)192 
In Ex parte Merryman,193 Chief Justice Taney, sitting as a circuit 
judge, held that the authority rested in the legislative department, 
relying on the placement of the provision in a section of the 
Constitution dealing with limitations on congressional power. Many 
state and lower courts agreed.194 The issue never went to the Supreme 
Court, and some writers have subsequently doubted whether, as an 
historical matter, the placement of the clause has any significance.195 
Under the second proposed criterion, the issue of which branch 
may suspend the writ presents questions as to whether each is capable 
of protecting its own interests. If the president withdraws the writ 
against the wishes of Congress, the legislators may vote to restore it, 
 
 189. Cf. Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1212–14, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (concluding that a 
United States court was precluded by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement from overturning 
a German court’s conviction of two American servicemen, despite possible deprivations of 
rights at their trial).  
 190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 191. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF 18 (1976) 
(“The Constitution grants this great emergency power to no one; it assumes its existence as a 
matter of fact and common law.”). 
 192. See supra Part I.B. 
 193. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
 194. See Joseph C. Long, Ex Parte Merryman: The Showdown Between Two Great 
Antagonists: Lincoln and Taney , 14 S.D. L. REV. 207, 219 (1969) (“[T]he issue was to come 
before a number of state and lower federal courts . . . . The majority of the decisions supported 
Taney.” (footnote omitted)). 
 195. See id. (arguing that the placement may have had more to do with “tying up of loose 
ends” than with any attempt to reference the powers of Congress). In any event, Lincoln simply 
ignored the rulings. Id. at 220. 
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although they may have to overcome a presidential veto.196 Were the 
president’s order also opposed by an aroused popular opinion,197 it 
would even be more likely to fail. In the informed and astute 
judgment of Professor Robert Dahl 
a president who defies Congress cannot succeed in his defiance 
unless he and his policy have more support in the influential publics 
of the nation than the congressmen he opposes. A president who 
persists in opposing both the Congress and a large fraction of 
articulate opinion is headed for certain defeat, one way or 
another.198 
Other questions might also arise, however, that do not turn on 
the respective authority of the elected branches. These include 
whether a state of “rebellion” currently exists, whether the “public 
safety” requires the suspension, and whether it is necessary for the 
body suspending the writ to continue to observe other constitutional 
provisions such as the Fourth Amendment.199 Since negative answers 
to these questions would prohibit both Congress and the president 
from suspending the writ, they fall into the class of personal liberties 
that should be subject to judicial review. However, the first two 
questions I suggest are plainly candidates for substantial judicial 
deference to the properly constituted political bodies, if not for a 
conclusion of no manageable standards, which would foreclose any 
further judicial involvement whatsoever. 
2. Act of State Doctrine.  Under the “act of state” doctrine, the 
judiciary will recognize the official act of a foreign government 
without inquiring into its validity. This resembles the political 
question doctrine in that its premise is that there are some subjects 
that judges are less competent to examine than are the political 
branches. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,200 the Court relied 
largely on the rationale that the judiciary should not interfere with 
 
 196. In fact, Congress authorized Lincoln’s suspension of the writ, but not until nearly two 
years later. Id. at 223 n.71. 
 197. See id. at 221 (discussing the possibility that the “mood of the country” may have 
changed since the mid-nineteenth century to make suspension of the writ far more difficult). 
 198. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND 
PERFORMANCE 145 (1972). See generally  CHOPER, supra  note 13, at 311–14 (discussing the 
electorate’s check on executive abuse). 
 199. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 146–47 (1957). 
 200. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).  
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primarily executive functions. The case involved Cuba’s decision to 
nationalize sugar produced by an American company.201 After a 
distributor turned over the proceeds from its sale of sugar to the 
American owners, the national bank of Cuba (Cuba’s assignee) sued 
in a U.S. court to recover them.202 Rejecting the defendant’s argument 
that the bank’s claim failed because it was founded on an 
expropriation that violated international law, the Court concluded 
that the act of state doctrine prohibited it from inquiring into the 
validity of the Cuban government’s action.203 
Although the opinion did not explicitly invoke the political 
question doctrine, it drew on similar reasoning in explaining its 
reluctance to monitor a foreign nation’s official act. While the 
Constitution did not “require the act of state doctrine” nor 
“irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the 
validity of foreign acts of state,” the principle had “‘constitutional’ 
underpinnings.”204 The Court noted that “basic relationships between 
branches of government in a system of separation of powers” and 
questions of “the competency of dissimilar institutions”205 both 
supported the executive’s need for flexibility in matters of 
international relations and diplomacy. The judiciary might 
appropriately decide matters of international law when a great degree 
of “codification or consensus” existed, but there was no such unity of 
opinion on the legitimacy of expropriation.206 In negotiating with 
countries that had American property, an eight-Justice majority 
reasoned, the executive might prefer not to be confined by a judicial 
determination of the action’s illegality, and the Court should 
therefore refrain from pronouncing on it.207 
The cases, however, have not always applied the precept so 
broadly. In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,208 
also involving sugar and expropriation, the Court concluded that it 
could adjudicate the question of whether Cuba ’s actions were valid 
because the executive branch had explicitly requested that the act of 
 
 201. Id. at 401. 
 202. Id. at 406. 
 203. Id. at 428. 
 204. Id. at 423. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 428. 
 207. Id. at 432. 
 208. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).  
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state doctrine not be applied.209 In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. 
Environmental Tectonics Corp.,210 the Court limited the doctrine in a 
different way, adopting a narrow view of what constitutes a foreign 
state’s “official act.” Holding that the doctrine should apply only 
when “the outcome of the case turns upon . . . the effect of official 
action by a foreign sovereign,” the Court ruled that this did not bar 
consideration of whether a military procurement contract with the 
Nigerian government would be rendered invalid if, as alleged, it had 
been obtained through bribery.211 
The act of state doctrine is not a true political question because 
the separation of powers issue it raises—allocation of responsibility 
between the executive and judiciary—is not driven by a textually- or 
functionally-based interpretation of the Constitution, but rather 
grounded in policy concerns—the belief that adjudicating the validity 
of foreign acts of state might hamper or embarrass the executive in 
certain circumstances. Therefore, the more flexible approach of First 
National City Bank and W.S. Kirkpatrick appears to be the preferable 
one because it permits judicial involvement particularly when there 
appears to be no possibility of interference with foreign relations. It 
may periodically be true that matters relating to the validity of 
foreign acts of state are better handled through the executive branch, 
which can consider them with special expertise and sensitivity. 
However, in the absence of the Court ruling, for functional reasons or 
because of original understanding, that the Constitution requires that 
all such decisions rest with the political branches,212 foreclosing all 
opportunity for judicial review of such issues probably goes too far. 
An appropriate method for achieving this balance would be that 
courts treat the principle expounded in Sabbatino as one of federal 
common law, not mandated by any constitutional separation of 
powers principle. As with other questions of federal common law, the 
 
 209. Id. at 768. 
 210. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).  
 211. Id. at 406. 
 212. See Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 106, 111 (1948) 
(holding that the president’s decision to approve or deny a certificate for foreign air 
transportation under a statute providing that such decisions should be “unconditionally subject 
to the President’s approval” was not subject to judicial review because it is a matter of “foreign 
policy. . . . wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments” ). The opinion did 
not address the issue of whether denial of all judicial review in respect to this decision denied 
due process. For further consideration, see Louis Henkin, Viet-Nam in the Courts of the United 
States: “Political Questions,” 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 284, 287 n.11 (1969). 
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Court’s default position could be altered by legislation—that is, 
Congress could direct the courts to adjudicate a particular category of 
cases involving an act of state. In addition, the executive could choose 
to waive the doctrine’s protection by taking an official position, as it 
did in First National City Bank, that judicial review of a specific action 
would not interfere with diplomatic concerns. 
3. Other “Nonconstitutional” Matters.  There are additional 
instances, somewhat akin to the “act of state” cases, in which federal 
courts have been called upon to construe a statute or treaty that 
hinges on matters of foreign affairs normally considered to be within 
the domain of the executive or legislative departments. In some of 
these situations, the Court may find that the law or treaty plainly 
vests a certain decision with the president or Congress. Though 
interpreting such statutes or treaties is obviously different in kind 
from expounding the ultimate meaning of the Constitution, there is 
an obvious parallel to the Court’s reading the Constitution so as to 
find a political question. Similarly, the Court may defer to the 
understanding of the political branches when determining the 
meaning of an ambiguous provision in a statute or treaty. 
The Justices have also frequently decided contract cases 
according to analogous principles, even though the political question 
doctrine has no direct bearing. Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co.,213 
for example, concerned an insurance claim for cargo and a ship seized 
near the Falkland Islands by the government of Buenos Aires, which 
had asserted jurisdiction over the islands.214 Since the plaintiff had 
been ordered by Buenos Aires not to hunt seals there on penalty of 
having his cargo seized,  the insurer argued that the plaintiff had not 
acted “with ordinary prudence.”215 The plaintiff responded that he 
was not required to heed the order because the U.S. government had 
refused to recognize Buenos Aires’s claim to the Falklands and had 
“insisted . . . that the seal fishery at those islands is a trade free and 
lawful to the citizens of the United States.”216 Finding that “[t]he 
action of the political branches of the government, in a matter that 
 
 213. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839). 
 214. Id. at 419–20. 
 215. Id. at 421. 
 216. Id. at 419. 
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belongs to them, is conclusive,” the Court held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to recover for the loss.217 
A like issue arose in Kennett v. Chambers,218 which considered 
the validity of an 1836 contract to provide military assistance and 
volunteers on behalf of the independent state of Texas. The Court 
noted that, although Texas had declared itself independent at the 
time the contract had been entered into, the United States had not 
recognized this and was still bound by treaties with Mexico that 
declared Texas to be part of its territory.219 Finding the contract void, 
the Court held that “the question whether Texas had or had not at 
that time become an independent state . . . was a question for that 
department of our government exclusively which is charged with our 
foreign relations.”220 For the Court to decide such a question would 
be to “take upon ourselves the exercise of political authority, for 
which a judicial tribunal is wholly unfit.”221 
The import of these decisions is that the central legal question in 
each civil case was found to be wholly within the executive’s 
constitutional power to decide, whether or not the Justices agreed 
with it or would prefer to fashion a different rule of law. It is 
important to note, however, that the Court’s analysis was grounded in 
national policy (or federal common law), which the Justices felt was 
best served by deferring to the decision of another department. The 
Court was not relying on fundamental questions of constitutional 
structure and the legitimacy of judicial review that are implicated in 
true political questions as defined in this Article. 
Statutory questions that encompass foreign policy have also 
arisen concerning judicial capacity to determine whether a state of 
war exists.222 Though the political question doctrine is not implicated 
here because the question is not constitutional, there is a clear 
 
 217. Id. at 420, 422. For a more extensive discussion of Williams and several similar cases, 
see Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the “Political Question Doctrine,” and Foreign Relations, 
17 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1155–58 (1969). 
 218. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 45 (1852).  
 219. Id. at 46. 
 220. Id. at 50–51. 
 221. Id. at 51. For further descriptions of a series of early cases reaching a range of 
outcomes, see Scharpf, supra note 52, at 546 (“Whatever may explain these differing results, I 
fail to see how such an explanation could be reduced to any internally consistent interpretation 
of the constitutional grant of the treaty power.”); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as 
National Law: “Political Questions,” 104 U. PA. L. REV. 451, 485–92 (1956). 
 222. For consideration of this problem in the context of the manageable standards criterion, 
see supra note 56. 
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parallel between the two situations. In Ludecke v. Watkins,223 the 
Court considered whether the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, which 
authorized the president to deport resident aliens at his discretion in 
the event of a “declared war” or an actual or threatened “invasion or 
predatory incursion,”224 could be applied to a German national who 
had been ordered removed from the United States in early 1946.225 
The deportee’s habeas corpus petition argued that the delegated 
power “did not survive cessation of actual hostilities.”226 The Court 
held that, “[b]arring questions of interpretation and 
constitutionality,” the Alien Enemy Act was among a group of 
statutes that preclude judicial review.227 While not foreclosing the 
possibility that there might be circumstances under which “it would 
be open to this Court to find that a war though merely formally kept 
alive had in fact ended,” the Court nevertheless concluded that the 
termination of a state of war was a “political act,” to be accomplished 
through “legislation or Presidential proclamation” rather than judicial 
decision.228 Moreover, although the president’s authority under the 
Act “beg[an] when war [was] declared,” it was “not exhausted when 
the shooting stop[ped].”229 The Court, while recognizing the 
possibility that “[s]uch great war powers may be abused,” believed 
“that is a bad reason for having judges supervise their exercise.”230  
Four dissenters reasoned that the statute did not say that 
whether a state of war continued was outside judicial examination, 
and that it should not be so construed. They noted that the petitioner 
would be deported without “any judicial inquiry whatever into the 
truth of his allegations”231 and that a state of war still existed with 
Germany in 1946 was a mere “fiction” that should not “afford[] a 
basis for [the] holding that our laws authorize the peacetime 
banishment of any person on the judicially unreviewable conclusion 
of a single individual. The 1798 Act did not grant its extraordinary 
 
 223. 335 U.S. 160 (1948).  
 224. Id. at 161 (quoting the Alien Enemy Act, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577, as amended, ch. 55, 40 
Stat. 531 (1798) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000))). 
 225. Id. at 162–63. 
 226. Id. at 163, 166. 
 227. Id. at 163–64. 
 228. Id. at 168, 169. 
 229. Id. at 167. 
 230. Id. at 172. 
 231. Id. at 174. 
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and dangerous powers to be used during the period of fictional 
wars.”232 
The German deportee’s claim could easily have been framed as a 
due process violation and would therefore presumptively qualify for 
judicial review under my approach. This should lead the Court to 
look at the Act with special care because a statutory interpretation of 
the question of whether a “declared war” still existed could avoid the 
constitutional question. Nor was there any indication in Ludecke that 
this path was precluded by the Constitution. The majority opinion’s 
ruling that the law commits to the president the right to determine the 
existence of a “declared war” involved ordinary statutory 
interpretation. A finding that a statute requires judicial deference on 
a particular point is wholly different from the Court’s judgment that it 
should refrain entirely from deciding a question. 
D. Congressional Rules and Procedures 
1. In General.  As already indicated, most constitutional 
provisions that specify how Congress should act in respect to its 
internal governance are primarily housekeeping provisions and are 
not mainly intended to secure individual rights. Congress may amend 
these rules at will and, in most cases, has adequate incentives to 
enforce compliance with them. If it chooses neither to formally 
change the procedures nor to demand adherence to them, a waiver on 
its part may readily be implied. Thus, little stands to be  gained from 
judicial involvement. 
Legislative enactments alleged as violating constitutionally 
required procedures have been generally held to be political 
questions.233 In most instances this is the proper treatment since the 
rules, usually found in Article I, ordinarily  concern protections for 
one house of Congress. This is analogous to constitutional issues of 
separation of powers between the political branches, when the 
contention is that Congress has exceeded its authority vis-à-vis the 
executive or vice versa. Just as each of these departments has 
numerous, effective techniques that may be used to protect its 
 
 232. Id. at 178. 
 233. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).  
012306 03_CHOPER .DOC  2/6/2006   10:19 AM 
1506 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1457 
interests against the other,234 so also do the Senate and House of 
Representatives. 
A contrary example of the Court’s treatment of this matter, 
however, arose in United States v. Munoz-Flores.235 A criminal 
defendant, ordered to pay a special assessment to a congressionally 
created “Crime Victims Fund,” challenged the statute on the ground 
that it had not originated in the House of Representatives, as Art. I, § 
7, cl. 1 requires for revenue bills.236 The government urged 
nonjusticiability on the ground that a challenge to Congress’s 
judgment in this matter would show a “lack of respect” for a 
coordinate branch,237 and that the House could protect itself by 
“refusing to pass a bill if it believes that the Origination Clause has 
been violated.”238 The government also noted the absence of an 
individual rights claim.239 The Court, however, found that the House’s 
ability to defend its own interests should not curtail judicial review to 
ensure that the Constitution’s allocation of powers within the 
legislative branch was maintained.240 Policing such constitutional 
restrictions, the Court reasoned, guarded individual rights, since “the 
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty.”241 It then 
upheld the statute on the merits because the law establishing the fund 
did not constitute a “Bil[l] for raising Revenue” within the meaning 
of the Origination Clause.242 
It seems clear to me that the government’s position in Munoz-
Florez, rather than the Justices’, was right. To the extent that Article I 
may have forbidden the statute to have been introduced in the 
Senate, it is difficult to see any threat to personal liberty posed by the 
House’s waiver of that mandate by supporting the bill’s passage. It is 
 
 234. See generally CHOPER, supra note 13, at 275–314. 
 235. 495 U.S. 385 (1990).  
 236. Id. at 387. 
 237. Id. at 390–91. 
 238. Id. at 392. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 393. 
 241. Id. at 394 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). For an extensive consideration (and rejection) of this view—that 
since the separation of powers principle was perceived from the time of its origin as a keystone 
for guaranteeing the liberty of the people, its preservation is eminently entitled to judicial 
protection—see CHOPER, supra  note 13, at 263–315. 
 242. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 398. 
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undisputed that this is not a situation in which no organ of 
government could act.243 
There are a number of other examples of constitutional text that 
fall into this category. They include Article I, § 5, cl. 2, requiring that 
a quorum of each House must be present to “do Business,” the 
various clauses setting minimum ages for various elected officials, and 
the dictate of Art. I, § 5, cl. 4 that neither house adjourn for more 
than three days without the other’s consent.244 These are all 
housekeeping provisions, concerning only the  internal workings of a 
single branch. Apart from the unlikely event that a person can fashion 
an individual rights claim regarding one of these conditions, there is 
no justification for judicial review. 
2. Individual Rights.  Not all constitutional provisions that 
govern the internal operations of Congress, however, are 
unconcerned with individual rights. Probably the most obvious is that 
“[n]o Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed.”245 Another example of 
one that does implicate personal liberties is the Speech and Debate 
Clause, which provides that Senators and Representatives “shall not 
be questioned in any other Place” for “any Speech and Debate in 
either House.”246 There are two ways in which this provision might be 
interpreted to raise an individual rights issue. First, and most 
obviously, to the extent that the elected official’s speech falls within 
the scope of the First Amendment’s protection, few special issues are 
involved. At the least, the expression of unpopular views by a 
member of Congress is at the core of the Constitution’s commitment 
to a robust democratic process. Indeed, active judicial review would 
secure not simply the rights of the legislative representative, but those 
of his constituents as well. 
Second, the Court has also suggested that the Clause might 
create an immunity for members of Congress that reaches beyond the 
coverage of the free speech guarantee. In United States v. Johnson,247 
for example, the provision was construed as granting a broad 
“legislative privilege.”248 The Court found that a Representative could 
 
 243. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 244. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 380 (3d ed. 2000). 
 245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 247. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).  
 248. Id. at 179. 
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not be prosecuted for a speech he had made on the House floor, 
allegedly “in return for remuneration from private interests”249 (i.e., a 
bribe), in which he urged the Justice Department to dismiss 
indictments against savings and loan companies.250 The Clause was 
characterized as preserving the separation of powers among the 
federal branches, by protecting  members of Congress “against 
possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a 
hostile judiciary.”251 To the extent that the Speech and Debate 
principle shelters not only “words spoken in debate,” but anything 
“generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in 
relation to the business before it,”252 it plainly exceeds the boundaries 
of the First Amendment, thus making any individual rights claim 
much more difficult. Whether a theory can be developed that the 
Clause, as interpreted in this way, protects a different sort of personal 
liberty—one that is derived from the Member’s supporters to ensure 
the effectiveness of their vote253 or an alleged constitutional right to 
be represented in the halls of Congress by the candidate they 
successfully supported—is beyond the present discussion. 
3. Membership Qualifications.  A different kind of question 
about congressional procedure concerns Congress’s rights to assess 
the qualifications of its members. In Powell v. McCormack,254 a House 
resolution excluded Representative Adam Clayton Powell from the 
90th Congress. The House did not deny that Powell had been duly 
elected by his constituents and met the Art. I, § 2, cl. 2 criteria of age, 
citizenship, and residence.255 Instead, the resolution responded to 
Powell’s refusal to testify about alleged improprieties during his prior 
term as chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor.256 
 
 249. Id. at 180. 
 250. Id. at 171–72, 184–85. 
 251. Id. at 179. 
 252. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881).  
 253. For fuller development of the scope of this asserted right, see infra notes 268–69 and 
accompanying text. 
 254. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).  
 255. Id. at 489. 
 256. See id. at 491–93 (noting that a Select Committee of the House had reported that 
Powell had asserted an unwarranted privilege in a New York court, misappropriated House 
funds for personal use, and made false expenditure reports to the Committee on House 
Administration). 
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By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the House had 
decided to allow Powell to take his seat in the 91st Congress,257 and it 
was certainly possible for the Court to have avoided the question of 
the House resolution’s constitutionality on the basis of mootness.258 
The Court, however, found that Powell’s claim for back pay during 
the time he was excluded remained a live issue.259 The central 
question was whether the scope of Congress’s power to determine the 
qualifications of its members constituted a political question. The 
defendants (the Speaker of the House et al.) contended that Art. I,  
§  5’s language, that “[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the . . . 
Qualifications of its own Members,”260 was a “‘textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment’ to the House of the ‘adjudicatory power’ 
to determine Powell’s qualifications.”261 Powell responded that 
Congress’s authority was limited to determining whether the age, 
citizenship, and residence terms had been met, and the House had 
specifically decided they had been in his case.262 After reviewing 
historical materials from the Constitutional Convention and the 
ratification debates,263 the Court concluded that Powell’s view was the 
more historically plausible.264 It further rejected the argument that 
interfering in this intra-House controversy would produce an 
“‘embarrassing confrontation’” with a coordinate branch.265 
Whatever the merits of the Court’s historical and textual analysis 
on whether age, residence, and citizenship exhausted the factors, it 
 
 257. Id. at 495–96. 
 258. See id. at 495–500 (discussing and rejecting the respondents’ claim of mootness); id. at 
559 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that, because of mootness, the Court should not have 
decided the “novel, difficult, and delicate constitutional questions” at issue). Professor Terrance 
Sandalow submits that the Court did not take this seemingly simpler way out, perhaps because it 
was influenced by the popular view that racism played a role in Powell’s exclusion, but mainly 
because of the Court’s belief that it should serve as “the ultimate interpreter and defender of 
the Constitution.” See Terrance Sandalow, in Symposium, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 
17 UCLA L. REV. 164, 165–68 (1969). 
 259. 395 U.S. at 496. 
 260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 261. 395 U.S. at 519. 
 262. See id. at 520 (stating Powell’s claim that “an elected representative may be denied his 
seat only if the House finds he does not meet one of the standing qualifications expressly 
prescribed by the Constitution”). 
 263. See id. at 522–47 (examining pre -Convention precedent, Convention debates and 
decisions, and post-ratification cases). 
 264. See id. at 547–48 (holding that Art. I, § 5 reserves exclusively to Congress only the 
power to judge upon the express qualifications in the Constitution). 
 265. Id. at 548. 
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ultimately evaded the real political question criterion of textual 
commitment. The position of the defendant members of Congress 
was that “the House, and the House alone, has power to determine 
who is qualified to be a member.”266 That is, the Constitution 
excluded judicial review of the matter of “who is qualified to be a 
member,” and while there might be instances when the Court 
believes that Congress has acted ultra vires, this cannot be corrected 
by the Justices. The Court, however, answered a very different 
question by focusing on the issue of whether the three stated 
qualifications were the exclusive ones Congress could consider. The 
Justices never explored the scope of Congress’s power to be the final 
arbiter of constitutional qualifications.267 
On this ultimate issue of justiciability, I have argued throughout 
this Article that, to the extent that an individual rights claim is 
present, the Court should be reluctant to find that the text of the 
Constitution completely forecloses judicial review. Indeed, it will 
often be possible to state a personal liberty violation when a member 
of Congress is excluded, for example, because of an impermissible 
factor such as race or religion.268 Moreover, even when a specific, 
textually designated right of this kind is not at stake, a more general 
objection might be raised—that Congress erred in administering the 
relevant criteria, for example. The House of Representatives’ refusal 
to seat Congressman Powell falls into this category. In such situations, 
the rejected candidate might assert an abridgement of his 
constituents’ fundamental right to vote. Similar reasoning would 
apply to the charge that Congress seated someone who lacked the 
requisite qualifications. In both of these scenarios, a minority of the 
nation’s citizens would have their ballots totally disregarded in 
violation of a constitutional guarantee by members of the legislative 
branch elected by a majority. Whether the Court should recognize 
such an individual franchise right (alluded to at several points in 
earlier discussion),269 and, if so, how broadly it reaches, is beyond 
present consideration. Still, it is worth noting the foundation on which 
it rests: in all the instances that it has been raised, the official 
 
 266. Id. at 519 (emphasis added).  
 267. See Sandalow, supra note 258, at 171–73. 
 268. See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 118, 137 (1966) (holding that the Georgia House 
could not exclude a duly elected member for criticizing the federal government’s policy on 
Vietnam). 
 269. See supra notes 126, 184–86, and 253 and accompanying text.  
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successfully supported by the complaining voters has been wholly 
disabled. This is comparable to the government flatly preventing 
citizens from casting their ballots or refusing to count them 
altogether. It appears to be distinguishable in kind from most other 
situations in which an elector’s preferences have been thwarted by 
subsequent action that is assertedly unconstitutional—for example, 
when voters complain that their ballots have been rendered 
ineffective because the representative they elected lost in opposing an 
allegedly unconstitutional law. The Court’s recognition of an 
abridgement of a constitutional liberty under such circumstances is 
little different than a ruling that citizens have an enforceable right to 
have their government act constitutionally. 
E. Constitutional Amendments 
The mechanics of the Article V amendment process have also 
played a significant role in the Supreme Court’s development of the 
political question doctrine. Two special concerns arise regarding 
judicial review. First, because amending the Constitution is the only 
method available to overrule Supreme Court decisions by political 
means, the Court’s invalidation of a constitutional amendment on 
procedural grounds would rightfully face challenges about such 
action’s legitimacy.270 Second, many questions concerning ratification 
of amendments involve details of legislative procedure about which 
the judiciary lacks particular competence, and, most importantly for 
the message of this Article, to the extent such issues pose serious 
questions of law, they generally raise matters of federalism rather 
than individual rights. Because of these factors, particularly the first, 
it may be contended that all questions respecting the amendment 
process should fall into the realm of the political branches. The 
argument might run as follows: although Article V does not explicitly 
qualify as a textual commitment to a coordinate branch, it is 
nonetheless evident from the Constitution’s structure, theory, and 
 
 270. See Scharpf, supra note 52, at 588–89 (noting the tension between judicial review of the 
Article V amendment process and democratic principles); Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution 
We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 444–45 
(1983) (recognizing the need for limits on judicial construction of Article V processes to prevent 
the “enormous vices” of “exclusive judicial control”); see also David Orentlicher, Conflicts of 
Interest and the Constitution, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 713, 745–62 (2002) (discussing the 
political question doctrine and judicial supremacy). 
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surrounding context that this was the Framers’ intention as well as the 
most sensible way to construe it. 
This view has considerable merit. Still, where questions of 
individual rights are involved, I would urge that judicial involvement 
is needed to ensure that the procedures prescribed by Article V have 
been followed. It must be noted that I do not suggest that anything in 
the Constitution precludes the alteration (or elimination) of 
individual rights by amendment. Thus, for example, a properly 
adopted amendment that prohibits flag-burning should be 
acknowledged and enforced by the Court. But such allowable 
abrogations of existing personal liberties, under the First Amendment 
or other clauses securing these guarantees, are constitutionally valid 
only when the requirements of Article V have been satisfied. 
Otherwise, a simple majority may accomplish through the 
amendment process what the Constitution does not permit it to do. 
The distinction drawn above hinges on the constitutional source 
of the objections to an amendment. To illustrate, in Leser v. 
Garnett,271 the Court, in a brief opinion, rejected on the merits claims 
that the Nineteenth Amendment (guaranteeing women’s suffrage) 
was invalid. The plaintiffs argued, first, that to subject Maryland to an 
amendment it had failed to ratify would “destroy[] its autonomy as a 
political body”; second, that the amendment was contrary to the 
constitutions of several approving states; and third, that two states’ 
ratifications had been procedurally defective.272 
Under my proposed framework, these claims should all have 
been treated as political questions. The two “substantive” contentions 
in Leser concern state sovereignty and the balance of power between 
states and the federal government. Consequently, the Court should 
have left them, as well as the underlying “procedural” problem, to the 
political process. The Justices should have reviewed the matter, 
however, if the plaintiffs had instead stated their substantive 
objections to the Nineteenth Amendment in terms of individual 
rights. The challengers might have argued, for example, that by 
permitting women to vote, the Nineteenth Amendment diluted their 
existing voting rights (a frivolous claim, especially when made against 
 
 271. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).  
 272. Id. at 136–37. 
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a constitutional amendment).273 Or, more persuasively, the contention 
might have been that the ratifying state legislatures were the product 
of unconstitutional apportionment.274 The claim might be framed in 
respect to the individual right to vote recognized in Baker v. Carr.275 If 
abridgement of individual rights, rather than infringement of 
Maryland’s sovereignty, had been the issue in Leser, it would have 
been appropriate for the Court to scrutinize the procedural issues that 
the plaintiffs raised about Article V’s strictures not being followed. 
At the risk of drawing a somewhat vulnerable distinction, made 
in an effort to limit the Court’s participation in the amendment 
process, the principle of adjudicating a procedural challenge to an 
amendment when individual rights are involved should not apply 
when an amendment purports to expand existing individual rights in 
the Constitution or to announce new ones. The Justices should only 
review procedural questions about the ratification process when an 
amendment will diminish established protections. Many proposed 
amendments, from the Equal Rights Amendment to the removal of 
the disqualification of foreign-born presidents, fall into the former 
category. The Court’s exercise of the awesome, antimajoritarian 
power of judicial review is justified when existing individual rights are 
being diminished in the amendment process because it serves to 
safeguard the constitutionally secured interests of certain minorities 
who could not be expected to prevail through the normal democratic 
process. That rationale does not apply, however, to amendments that 
enlarge rights or add new ones, even when those amendments plainly 
involve personal liberties. To illustrate, suppose the Supreme Court 
decides that it is unconstitutional for states to prohibit gay marriage. 
 
 273. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966) (“[T]he distinction challenged by 
appellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing 
barrier to the exercise of the franchise.”). 
 274. For discussion of the merits of this matter, compare Peter H. Wolf, An 
Antireapportionment Amendment: Can It Be Legally Ratified?, 52 A.B.A. J. 326, 326–31 (1966) 
(discussing whether an antireapportionment amendment, passed by mala pportioned state 
legislatures, could be invalidated by the Supreme Court), with Arthur Earl Bonfield, The 
Dirksen Amendment and the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REV. 949, 972–76 (1968) 
(contending that, while a malapportioned legislature should not be allowed to perpetuate its 
unconstitutional condition, a mere application by such a body to create an Article V state 
convention might not be unreasonable), and Robert G. Dix on, Jr., Article V: The Comatose 
Article of Our Living Constitution? , 66 MICH. L. REV. 931, 940 (1968) (arguing that the “one 
man, one vote” principle violated by malapportionment would be only partially upheld by state 
ratifying conventions or statewide popular referenda, but would be completely honored by 
nationwide popular referenda). 
 275. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
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Then, to overturn that decision, an amendment is ratified that permits 
states to define marriage as being only between a man and a woman. 
Alternatively, suppose the Supreme Court decides that states may 
constitutionally prohibit gay marriage. The amendment to change this 
ruling says that states cannot do so. In this second scenario, the 
amendment effectively establishes a new constitutionally guaranteed 
personal liberty—the right of gay people to marry—just as one that 
prohibited states from levying an income tax. Therefore, the Court 
should not review its ratification process. Although the amendment 
does impose new restrictions on states’ rights,276 it does not place 
limits on interests that the Court must safeguard in order to fulfill its 
critical role in our system.277 
The oft-cited case of Coleman v. Miller illustrates a situation 
where the Court properly ruled against justiciability. The plaintiffs 
contended that Kansas’s approval of the proposed Child Labor 
Amendment (enabling Congress to prohibit employment of minors) 
was ineffective because (1) the lieutenant governor had no right to 
cast the deciding vote in the state senate on this matter,278 (2) 
Kansas’s earlier rejection of the amendment precluded later 
ratification,279 and (3) as almost thirteen years had passed since 
Congress initially proposed the amendment, it had “lost its vitality 
through lapse of time.”280 The Court found the latter issues to be 
political questions on which Congress possessed superior expertise.281 
 
 276. This was true of the Fourteenth Amendment, whose “procedural” validity was 
questioned regarding “the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in light of the previous 
rejection or attempted withdrawal.” Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939). For the 
rejection of a judicial challenge to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Maryland 
Petition Committee v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp 823, 826–27 (D. Md. 1967) (noting the completion of 
the procedural requirements for ratification and adoption and the persuasiveness of the 
Supreme Court’s repeated reliance on the amendment). 
 277. Another variant on this set of hypotheticals may be helpful in describing the contours 
of my approach. Suppose the following sequence of events: (1) After a Supreme Court ruling 
that there is no constitutional right to marry someone of the same gender, a constitutional 
amendment proposes that same-sex marriage may not exist in the United States; (2) while the 
submitted amendment is pending, the Justices overrule their earlier decision and hold that there 
is a fundamental right to marry a person of either gender; and (3) a gay or lesbian couple then 
bring suit for a declaration that the now-approved amendment is procedurally flawed. Assuming 
no jurisdictional or procedural hurdles, the Court should treat the issue as justiciable since the 
substance of the amendment contradicts a judicially determined individual constitutional right. 
 278. 307 U.S. 433, 436 (1939). 
 279. Id. at 447. 
 280. Id. at 451. 
 281. Id. at 450, 454. The Court was equally divided as to the first issue. Id. at 447. 
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In respect to the third, for example, the Court concluded that a 
variety of “political, social, and economic conditions” might affect the 
question of how long an amendment should remain pending and that 
such questions should be decided by a body possessing “full 
knowledge and appreciation” of such matters.282 
At the root of the claims in Coleman were questions about how 
Congress should exercise its delegated authority with respect to the 
states. The first two issues concerned procedures during state 
ratification of proposed constitutional amendments,283 and the third 
involved a matter that Congress could indisputably have addressed 
(and now regularly does with a designated period) in its submission to 
the states. These are all constitutional issues that affect only the 
balance of political power between the states and the national 
government. Especially since the Child Labor Amendment itself 
involved only states’ rights and since individual liberty was not at 
stake, the substance of the challenges was better settled within the 
political process and judicial involvement was not called for.284 
Among the several reasons for Coleman’s notability is the 
plurality opinion’s suggestion that it might be difficult to develop 
manageable standards to determine whether a “reasonable time had 
elapsed” since an amendment was first sent to the states.285 Although 
the Justices observed that reasonableness varies with circumstances, 
and that “the question of a reasonable time in many cases would 
involve . . . an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, 
political, social, and economic” that the judiciary was ill-equipped to 
 
 282. Id. at 454. 
 283. A similar matter arose in Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920), as to whether Article V 
permits ratification to be accomplished by referendum. Id. at 224. Note that if the Court in 
Hawke had only engaged in statutory interpretation of the joint resolution proposing the 
amendment—which “provided that the Amendment should be inoperative unless ratified . . . by 
the legislatures of the several States,” id. at 225—then a true political question issue would be 
absent. 
 284. Professor Walter Dellinger has argued that nearly all questions pertaining to the 
procedural validity of constitutional amendments present a strong case for judicial review; that 
there is no contrary support in the Constitution or in the Court’s past practice; and that allowing 
such questions of an amendment’s validity to be decided on an ad hoc basis by Congress will 
only foster uncertainty on the important matter of whether a particular amendment is currently 
in effect. Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the 
Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 405 (1983). Professor Laurence Tribe responds that 
Dellinger overstates the da ngers in leaving questions about the amendment process to Congress 
and too easily dismisses the legitimacy concerns of extensive judicial involvement. Tribe, supra 
note 270, at 434–35. 
 285. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 453. 
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make,286 I believe that if the substance of the proposed amendment 
had involved a claim of individual rights (rather than states’ rights), a 
manageable standard could have been worked out. 
The Coleman opinion in fact implied as much in its discussion of 
Dillon v. Gloss,287 which held that Congress could set time limits for 
an amendment’s ratification.288 The plurality noted that the Dillon 
Court’s  description of proposal and ratification as “but succeeding 
steps in a single endeavor” created a “fair implication that ratification 
must be sufficiently contemporaneous in the required number of 
States to reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively the 
same period.”289 Because this interpretation of the Constitution 
provides meaningful guidance as to how closely in time ratification 
must follow congressional approval, articulating manageable 
standards should not have been appreciably more challenging than in 
many other situations in which the Court has done so. Moreover, the 
Court could simplify its task further by adopting an appropriate 
standard of deference to any time limits Congress initially sets. Since 
the subject of constitutional modification submitted for ratification 
must involve established personal liberties in order to invoke judicial 
review under my approach, the degree of deference due to Congress’s 
conclusion should be similar to other cases respecting legislative fact 
finding for laws allegedly abridging individual rights.290 
F. Separation of National and State Authority 
Most issues of federalism—dividing power between the central 
government and the states—are readily identifiable as involving an 
exercise of authority by the national political branches (usually by 
Congress, but occasionally by the executive, either alone or in concert 
with the Senate) that allegedly intrudes into an area reserved to the 
states. There are some constitutional provisions, however, that 
prohibit certain action by the states but do not expressly grant it to 
 
 286. Id. 
 287. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).  
 288. See id. at 375–76 (“Of the power to Congress, keeping within reasonable limits, to fix a 
definite period for the ratification we entertain no doubt.”). 
 289. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 452. 
 290. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 506 n.24 
(1984) (discussing Supreme Court review of findings of fact by a state court when a federal right 
has been denied). 
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Congress. This kind of situation arose in the Legal Tender Cases,291 
where the question was whether Congress possessed the power under 
the Constitution to make treasury notes legal tender for debts.292 
Overruling its year-old decision in Hepburn v. Griswold,293 the Court 
concluded that it did.294 
The Court first rejected the argument that Art. I, § 8, cl. 5, 
permitting Congress “[t]o coin Money [and] regulate the Value 
thereof,” impliedly precluded Congress from making notes legal 
tender.295 Instead, the Court found, Art. I, § 10, cl. 1’s denial to the 
states of power to “coin Money” or to “make any Thing but gold and 
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts,”296 suggested by inference 
that Congress could issue notes as well as coin money. The Court 
stated that “[w]hatever power there is over the currency is vested in 
Congress. If the power to declare what is money is not in Congress, it 
is annihilated.”297 The Court noted that in other circumstances when 
the Constitution withheld a certain power from both the federal 
government and the states, the prohibition had not been “left to 
inference” but “expressly denied to both,” and that when authority 
“was expressly denied to the States only, it was for the purpose of 
rendering the Federal power more complete and exclusive.”298 
Although the Court alluded to “general power over the 
currency” as something the states had “surrendered,”299 the reference 
did not specifically involve the Tenth Amendment. Because of the 
explicit constitutional bar on state issuance of paper notes, there 
could be no argument that such authority was reserved to the states. 
Nevertheless, as the Court recognized, the underlying issue can be 
characterized as one of federalism. That is, an expansion of the scope 
of the federal government’s powers, even within an area in which the 
states are unable to act, may nevertheless indirectly weaken the 
 
 291. 79 U.S. 457 (1871). 
 292. Id. at 529. 
 293. 75 U.S. 603 (1870). 
 294. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 553. 
 295. Id. at 544–45. 
 296. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 297. 79 U.S. at 545. 
 298. Id. at 546. 
 299. Id. 
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states’ position. If no individual rights claim is present, this should be 
nonjusticiable under my view of the political question doctrine.300 
In fact, there was no assertion in the Legal Tender Cases that the 
purpose of the coinage limitation was to protect personal liberty—
simply that it denied power to Congress.301 Because there appears to 
be no direct individual rights claim comprehended within the 
question of Congress’s capacity to coin money or similar 
constitutional provisions, such issues should be treated as ones of 
federalism and, consequently, as political questions. 
G. Impeachment 
The role of impeachments in the constitutional structure suggests 
that they should not generally be subject to judicial review. The 
impeachment of judges in particular is, along with constitutional 
amendment, one of the two clearest means by which the Constitution 
provides a political check on the judicial power. That function would 
obviously be undermined if the courts were to assume any significant 
role in assessing the validity of the removal of judges. In addition, 
constitutional structure provides both internal and external checks on 
congressional abuse of its impeachment power, especially in 
connection with executive branch officials. By assigning a 
prosecutorial function to the House and a quasi-judicial one to the 
Senate, the Constitution ensures that impeachment will be subject to 
 
 300. A constitutional provision that functions similarly is Art. I, § 9, cl. 5, which prohibits the 
federal government from imposing an export tax. Although states lack this ability as well, the 
clause exists at least partially for their protection—to ensure that state economies are not 
hampered by excessive outside interference. Questions relating to this, like those concerning 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 5, should properly be considered nonjusticiable issues of federalism. 
 301. There was some suggestion in the case that issuing paper money would impair the 
obligation of contracts, although the reasoning was not that the Contract Clause bound the 
federal government, but rather that the purpose of denying Congress the power to make notes 
legal tender was to prevent the evil of national abridgment of private agreements. See Legal 
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 549 (rejecting this argument and proclaiming that “[e]very contract for 
the payment of money . . . is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government 
over the currency, whatever that power may be, and the obligation of the parties is, therefore, 
assumed with reference to that power”); see also Legal Tender Case, 110 U.S. 421, 451 (1884) 
(Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress’ alteration of the form of legal tender “disturb[s] 
the relation of commerce” and “ought not to be readily accepted”). If this claim were fashioned 
as a due process violation by Congress because of improper retroactive effect, cf. E. Enters. v. 
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) 
(agreeing with the plurality that the Coal Act of 1992 unconstitutionally imposed retroactive 
liability on the petitioner, but arguing that, in doing so, it violated due process principles rather 
than the Takings Clause), then it would present an independent individual rights issue. See 
supra note 38. 
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the independent deliberation of two bodies of government with 
separate electoral bases.302 Externally, legislators who undertake an 
unpopular impeachment may fear popular retaliation—an influential 
factor for House Republicans in deciding whether to impeach 
President Clinton.303 In all, these nonjudicial mechanisms for 
controlling rash or unfounded impeachments make the case for 
judicial nonintervention particularly strong. 
The general policy that holds impeachments not subject to 
judicial review applies to questions about (1) the process of 
impeachment, such as the allegations by the impeached judge in 
Nixon v. United States that allowing evidence against him to be heard 
by a Senate committee was not in keeping with the Senate’s obligation 
to “try” him,304 and (2) the substance of impeachable offenses, such as 
whether the meaning of the term “high crimes and misdemeanors” in 
a presidential impeachment should be left to congressional, not 
judicial determination.305 This principle of judicial forbearance also 
means that congressional decisions not to impeach (or to impeach and 
not to convict) are nonjusticiable.306 Several other matters would be 
encompassed within the nonjusticiable category by a Court ruling that 
the Impeachment Power grants Congress unreviewable authority to 
determine its scope. These issues—true political questions—include 
claims by a defendant that the Senate rather than the House voted for 
impeachment, that the House’s vote to impeach fell short of a 
majority, that the Senate’s vote for conviction was less than two-
thirds, that the Senators never took the “Oath or Affirmation” 
 
 302. For additional thoughts on this point, see Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching 
Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 301 (1999) (asserting that impeachment is actually a 
“special case” of judicial review, granting the Senate exclusive jurisdiction to hear impeachment 
cases and render final judgments). 
 303. See id. at 294 (“[I]f Congress is too hard or soft [on impeached presidents], they will 
pay at election time .”); see also John Harwood, GOP Assesses Possible Backlash Following Vote 
on Impeachment, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1998, at A9 (discussing the political implications of the 
Clinton impeachment on the 2000 elections). 
 304. 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993). 
 305. See Amar, supra note 302, at 301 (noting that no court will review Congress’ 
interpretation of that phrase). 
 306. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lessons of Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
603, 621–22 (1999) (discussing Congress’ power to choose not to impeach or convict and 
recognizing its apparent authority to pass a resolution censuring the president). 
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required by Art. I, § 3, or that the Chief Justice did not preside at the 
Senate trial.307 
Slightly different questions arise when Congress attempts to 
apply impeachment procedures in a way that the Constitution does 
not explicitly authorize. If the Senate fails to convict an impeached 
president, for example, may it nonetheless impose a lesser sanction, 
such as censure, as was discussed with respect to President Clinton?308 
Similarly, if the Senate convicts a president, does Art. II, § 4 mandate 
removal as the sanction, or may a greater or lesser punishment, such 
as a brief suspension from office, be imposed?309 Or suppose that the 
Chief Justice believed that it was impossible at this particular time for 
him to continue to direct the Court’s regular business and to preside 
on Capitol Hill, and consequently assigned the Senior Associate 
Justice to the impeachment trial. In the absence of an individual 
rights claim, I believe that constitutional structure leaves the 
determination of such potentially close questions to Congress. 
Judicial review is not called for because the issues concern the 
relationship between the executive and legislative branches; both are 
fully capable of looking after their own interests and ultimately 
subject to effective electoral check. 
The issues just set out plainly do not appear to involve personal 
liberties grounded in some other constitutional provision, such as the 
Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses, or the freedoms of speech, 
press, and religion. There are circumstances, however, under which 
the accused officeholder may present a valid individual rights claim 
independent of the provision on impeachment. For example, suppose 
Congress removed a federal judge who claimed that this was 
motivated solely by race. The judge would have a powerful equal 
protection claim, presumptively calling for the normal operation of 
nondeferential judicial review respecting alleged violations of 
 
 307. For approval of this view, see Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: 
Judicial Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44 DUKE L.J. 231, 275–76 (1994).  
 308. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance of the 
Impeachment and Trial of President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 377–78 (1999) (arguing 
that the Constitution does not limit Congress’ avenues of addressing misconduct to 
impeachment and permits public announcement of the views of members of Congress). 
 309. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”) (emphasis added). See generally Amar, 
supra note 302, at app. (reprinting an exchange Professor Amar conducted with Stuart Taylor, 
Jr. on these and related questions). 
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constitutionally secured personal liberties. Similarly, while the judge 
in Nixon v. United States did not specifically allege an individual rights 
violation, his argument—that the full Senate did not participate in the 
evidentiary hearing on the charges brought against him and thus 
abused the Senate’s authority to “try” all impeachments310—could 
readily have been framed as a due process infraction.311 
In respect to some types of alleged improprieties, the Court’s 
conclusion of nonjusticiability could be grounded in a textual 
commitment—that Art. I, §3’s grant to the Senate of “the sole Power 
to try all Impeachments” “makes clear that the Senate sits as judge 
and jury, and its rulings of fact and law therefore stand as res judicata 
in all other tribunals.”312 I probably would not interpret this, however, 
as applying beyond the Senate’s determination of the adjudicative 
facts alleged for impeachment.313 For example, the constitutionality of 
procedural protections are, at least in most instances, distinct from 
trial of the substantive charges. Also, factors like racial prejudice are 
wholly external to the litigation proceedings.314 In both situations, this 
res judicata rationale would not apply. Or a political question ruling 
may be based on the Court’s judgment that it lacks “judicially 
 
 310. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993). 
 311. In fact, a subsequently impeached federal judge made this claim, which was initially 
accepted by the federal district court, see Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 504 
(D.D.C. 1992) (“The fundamental constitutional concept of due process . . . demands that 
impeachments be tried by the full Senate.”), but then dismissed after Nixon was decided, see 
Hastings v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 3, 15 (D.D.C. 1993) (“In no sense of the word was Judge 
Hastings ‘tried’ by the full Senate. That having been said, because of the Nixon decision, there is 
no further relief that can be afforded Judge Hastings.”). 
 312. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 735 (4th ed. 2000); accord Amar, supra  note 302, at 301. 
 313. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (reasoning that even if the intent of 
the Framers had not been clear, the Court would have “resolved[d] any ambiguity in favor” of 
the people’s right to choose its representatives). 
 314. For the view that neither the text nor intention of the “sole Power to try all 
Impeachments” language, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6, supports the conclusion that the judiciary 
has no role whatever, see RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
120–21 (1973) (arguing that the impeachment power does not insulate acts from judicial review 
for due process violations); Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual 
Rights: The Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 127–134 (claiming that the 
Court’s decision in Nixon improperly restricts judicial review and thereby disrupts the 
separation of powers); Daniel A. Rezneck, Is Judicial Review of Impeachment Coming?, 60 
A.B.A. J. 681, 683 (1974) (“[I]f ‘try’ was used in its familiar sense . . . , it would not preclude 
judicial determination of purely legal issues—for example, what constitutes an impeachable 
offense?”). But see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 53–63 (1974) 
(finding no evidence of the Framers’ intent to create the “preposterous situation,” id. at 57, of 
judicial review of impeachment trials). 
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discoverable and manageable standards,”315 whose complexities are 
discussed above,316 because of the difficulties of ferreting out the 
needed adjudicative facts, or of determining the motivation of the 
relevant government actors—535 members of Congress are different 
from a handful of Senators on the Judiciary Committee for this 
purpose.317 (The president’s nomination and appointments powers 
present similar scenarios.318) 
Whether the Impeachment Power (and a few other provisions 
with similar characteristics) should be construed to overcome the 
usually strong presumption in our governmental system favoring 
resolution of the scope of constitutionally secured individual rights by 
Article III judges is exceedingly difficult. On the one hand, I believe 
that while the Nixon Court was right to rule against the judge, it 
would have been preferable, in my view, to have decided the merits of 
the due process claim (if properly presented) by finding that the 
Senate’s action, while not posing a political question, was not 
unconstitutional.319 On the other hand, it bears repeating my belief 
 
 315. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 316. See supra  Part I.C. As to whether the judiciary lacks manageable standards for defining 
“high crimes and misdemeanors,” it has been argued that the Framers chose the phrase 
precisely because it had an “ascertainable content in the English practice,” and that this 
historical standard “may yet be reduced to recognizable  categories that serve as an outline,” 
even if an “imprecise” one, for courts. Raoul Berger, Impeachment for “High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors,” 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 395, 446 (1971). 
 317. For a strongly presented description of the formidable problems connected with 
ascertaining the motives of even a single legislator, see Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting), stating that “how or 
where” to find a legislator’s actual intentions is “almost always an impossible task.” Id. at 636. 
 318. Other constitutional provisions have also been said to fall into this category. See 
Pushaw, supra  note 15, at 1197, for the view that the president’s decision whether to veto a bill is 
unreviewable by the courts because of the president’s absolute veto power. Similarly, see then-
Judge Scalia’s opinion in Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1986), where, in a 
closely contested congressional election, registered Republicans in Indiana  who supported the 
losing candidate challenged the decision by the House of Representatives to seat his rival, id. at 
446. Affirming the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, id. at 446, 451, the 
opinion reasoned that the text and history of the Elections Clause were “entirely consistent with 
[the] plain exclusion of judicial jurisdiction” because the Clause provides that the House  is not 
merely a judge but “‘the Judge’” of its members’ qualifications, id. at 447. Scalia does not argue 
that Congress’s power under the Elections Clause is unlimited—only that it is unreviewable by 
the judiciary. In practice, however, the result may be the same as in the veto case—that is, the 
Court may be required to dismiss a claim that the coordinate branch has exercised its power in a 
way that violates individual rights. 
 319. This is the position taken by Justice White’s concurrence; indeed, it is strongly 
suggested in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court, which undertook an historical 
inquiry into the meaning of the word “try” before pronouncing the matter a political question. 
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that conferring final authority on the president and Congress may 
well provide better protection for individual rights in at least some 
circumstances than would a judicial ruling on the merits that affords 
substantial deference to the political decisionmakers.320 
CONCLUSION 
Whether there should be a political question doctrine and, if so, 
how it should be implemented continue to be contentious and 
controversial issues, both within and outside the Court. This Article 
urges that the Justices should reformulate the detailed definition that 
they have utilized (at least formally) since 1962, and adopt four 
criteria to be applied in future cases. The least disputed—textual 
commitment—is the initial factor listed in Baker v. Carr. The other 
three are based on functional considerations rather than 
constitutional language or original understanding. The first of these—
“structural issues: federalism and separation of powers”—has been 
advanced and developed at length in my earlier work. It is based on a 
comparative advantage of the political process over the Court in 
sound constitutional decisionmaking respecting the relevant issues, as 
well as the trustworthiness respecting fundamental values of the 
national legislative and executive branches in doing so. The remaining 
two criteria involve removing questions of individual rights from the 
judiciary’s realm—something that would (and should) occur very 
infrequently. The manageable standards test recognizes that there 
may be constitutional provisions for which the Court lacks the 
capacity to develop clear and coherent principles. The generalized 
grievance guide is similar in many ways to “structural issues” in that it 
is also grounded in matters of comparative advantage and 
trustworthiness of results. 
 
 320. For forceful criticism of anything greater than a “certain degree” of judicial deference 
so as to avoid “grave potential dangers to individual liberty,” see Redish, supra note 12, at 1061. 
